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June 5, 2018 
 
 
 
Internal Revenue Service 
Attn: CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2018-43) Room 5203 
P.O. Box 7604 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044  
Re:  Notice 2018-43, 2018-2019 Priority 
Guidance Plan 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
The undersigned, Jeff Kadet and David Koontz, are both retired CPAs who have worked 
internationally for many years. Based on our prior working experience and in connection 
with some recent articles we have written, we have identified several projects that should 
be considered a high priority for the Treasury and the IRS. These projects, which are 
attached as appendices to this letter, cover a number of areas. 
Notice 2018-43 lists factors that the Treasury and the IRS consider in selecting projects 
for inclusion in its 2018-2019 Priority Guidance Plan. They include, for example, 
whether a project (i) involves significant issues relevant to many taxpayers, (ii) will 
reduce controversy and lessen the burden on taxpayers or the IRS, and (iii) promotes 
sound tax administration. All of the suggestions for projects that we are submitting more 
than satisfy all of these factors. More specifically, the effect of issuing new and/or 
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amended regulations as well as publishing guidance in these areas could result in 
hundreds of billions of dollars of additional tax revenues through: 
• Encouraging MNCs to unwind existing profit shifting structures that violate not 
only the spirit of the tax law but also its letter, as well as discouraging the 
formation of new profit shifting structures, and 
• Enabling the government to effectively and efficiently contest such aggressive 
profit shifting structures. 
A principal focus of our suggestions is the modernization and updating of regulations as 
well as providing guidance that will affect the many multinational corporations (MNCs) 
whose operations take place partially or wholly within the U.S. Many of these MNCs 
have embarked on complicated and legalistic schemes whose primary purpose is to shift 
profits without any real operational changes and to record those profits within zero- and 
low-taxed foreign members. Importantly, this includes not only U.S.-based MNCs, but 
also the many inverted MNCs that structured their inversions to remain untouched by the 
§7874 anti-inversion rules. 
The government has expended efforts and significant resources attempting to attack a 
multitude of MNC profit shifting structures. These efforts are labor intensive, time 
consuming, and have uncertain outcomes. Such attacks have relied on either transfer 
pricing (e.g. Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, etc.) or re-characterization adjustments (e.g. 
Caterpillar, Perrigo, etc.). These approaches, which have high costs for the government 
and taxpayers alike, are so subjective in nature and application that litigated decisions 
are little better than a toss-up. Edward Kleinbard, a noted tax law professor at the 
University of Southern California, commented the following after the Amazon Tax Court 
decision: 
Regardless of the correctness of the decision on the merits, cases like this -- 
costing millions of dollars to litigate, featuring 30 expert witnesses battling one 
another, and decided through a 200 page opinion -- are symptomatic of an 
unadministrable international tax system.1 
The recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has made few improvements in this regard because it 
still provides an up to ten-percentage point or higher incentive to shift profits out of the 
U.S. (often a 21% benefit for foreign-owned MNCs). Included in the attached appendices 
are suggestions that the IRS use the Code’s existing effectively connected income (ECI) 
rules as a tool in combating profit shifting and base erosion. Today, the Treasury and the 
IRS already have the full authority to modernize and focus the relevant regulations in a 
manner that would support application of the ECI rules to many MNC profit shifting 
schemes, thereby giving the IRS another and more effective means to tax this shifted 
income. Where the facts support it, imposition of ECI taxation may prove to be more 
objective and easier to sustain than either transfer pricing or re-characterization 
adjustments. 
																																																								1 Richard Rubin and Laura Stevens, “Banking & Finance: Amazon Defeats IRS in Tax 
Case”, Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, New York, N.Y., March 24, 2017. 
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The issuance by the Treasury and the IRS of modernized sourcing and ECI regulations 
along with our entity classification and other suggestions focused on profit shifting 
structures would provide clarity for both MNC taxpayers and the IRS.2 In addition, clear 
guidance would force outside audit firms to require their clients to make more 
meaningful disclosures of their potential tax liabilities or to actually accrue tax, interest, 
and penalties where some clients have inappropriately pushed the envelope in their profit 
shifting structures. This would be further helped by the IRS designating tax motivated 
structures having relevant factual, profit shifting characteristics as a “listed transaction”. 
The undersigned either together or separately have authored six articles covering how 
various MNC profit-shifting structures may well be subject to U.S. taxation under the 
effectively connected income (ECI) rules.3 The third of these articles details how such 
structures often create an unanticipated partnership for U.S. tax purposes that includes 
two or more MNC group members as partners in a partnership that conducts the joint 
business of the group members. An unanticipated partnership is important not only due to 
the applicable tax return filing obligations and §1446 withholding, but also due to the fact 
that a partnership simply makes the application of ECI taxation much easier. The sixth 
article notes how the manufacturing branch rule included in the Subpart F regulations 
may often apply to cause some gross income not caught by the ECI rules to be subpart F 
income. Additional background and issues relevant to suggestions made within this letter 
and its appendices are covered in detail in those articles.  
Although not specifically related to the profit shifting structures that the six articles deal 
with, many MNCs erode the U.S. tax base through deductible payments by U.S. group 																																																								2	These high priority regulation projects (with perhaps the sole exception of the TCJA 
change to the §863(b) sourcing rule) represent only modernization and clarification of 
existing rules that are already sufficiently broad to apply ECI taxation and partnership 
status to many profit shifting structures. Importantly, the Treasury and IRS should make 
clear that these rules will apply where the facts support them to any tax year whether 
before or after the issuance of new or amended regulations.	
3 1. Jeffery M. Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting: The Approach Everyone Forgets”, 148 
Tax Notes 193 (July 13, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2636073. 
2. Thomas J. Kelley, David L. Koontz, and Jeffery Kadet, "Profit Shifting: Effectively 
Connected Income and Financial Statement Risks”, 221(2) Journal of Accountancy 48 
(February 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2728157. 
3. Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected 
Partnership Status”, 151 Tax Notes 335 (April 18, 2016), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2773574. 
4. Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures: Making Ethical 
Judgments Objectively,” Part 1 at 151 Tax Notes 1831 (June 27, 2016) and Part 2 at 152 
Tax Notes 85 (July 4, 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811267 and 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811280. 
5. Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Internet Platform Companies and Base 
Erosion--Issue and Solution,” Tax Notes, Dec. 4, 2017, p. 1435, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3096925. 
6. Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Effects of New Sourcing Rule: ECI and Profit 
Shifting”, Tax Notes, May 21, 2018, p. 1119, copy attached as Appendix G. 
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members to foreign group members, including DRE subsidiaries. Often, these payments 
would be subject to the 30% U.S. withholding tax, but this tax is most typically reduced 
or eliminated by the claimed coverage of a tax treaty. The same is true for non-
withholding tax claims such as a claim by a foreign group member that it has no 
permanent establishment under an applicable tax treaty. Appendix F provides specific 
guidance for needed regulatory amendments that would prevent the inappropriate use of 
tax treaties to achieve double non-taxation. 
As a final comment, we believe that if the Treasury and the IRS were to make clear their 
intentions to pursue profit shifting structures through Notices, revenue rulings, or 
regulations, as appropriate, that would undoubtedly put all MNCs and their legal and tax 
advisors on “notice" to take potential partnership status and ECI taxation seriously. Also, 
if the IRS were to find as a part of its audit of just one MNC an unanticipated partnership 
for U.S. tax purposes, and impose significant ECI taxation, interest, and penalties, that 
information would undoubtedly be disclosed in the MNCs public SEC filings.4 From the 
moment of this "notice" becoming public (or an official notice from the IRS or Treasury), 
many MNCs, which have fact patterns under which it is “more likely than not" that 
partnership status and ECI taxation apply, would be required by their auditors to reflect 
additional disclosures and taxes in their financial statements. Further, some of these 
MNCs will determine that they must file Form 1120-F for the current and certain prior 
years and will voluntarily pay tax on their ECI.5 
Perhaps more importantly, any such “notice” will cause many MNC boards of directors 
and managements to re-think their aggressive profit-shifting structures and should result 
in significantly increased corporate tax payments with less profits ending up in tax 
havens. 
Note that any such “notice” would achieve one of the stated goals of the "Form 1120-F 
Non-Filer Campaign” released on January 31, 2017. That campaign states, in part: 
… The goal is to increase voluntary compliance by foreign corporations with a 
U.S. business nexus. 
 
 
*          *          *          *          * 
 
  
																																																								4 Public companies such as Microsoft, Caterpillar, Coca Cola, and Facebook have 
included in their SEC filings disclosures of IRS transfer pricing and re-characterization 
adjustments. See, for example, page A-30 of the Caterpillar Inc. Form 10-K for its year 
ended December 31, 2014, filed February 17, 2015. 
5 See in particular the article “Profit Shifting: Effectively Connected Income and 
Financial Statement Risks”, which is included as article 2 in the listing within footnote 3. 
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We hope that the above information is useful to the Treasury and the IRS. Either of us 
would be glad to speak by telephone with you or to respond to emailed questions if that 
would be helpful. 
 
Very truly yours, 
	 	 	
Jeffery M. Kadet    David L. Koontz 
(206) 395-9849    (773) 315-7660 
jeffkadet@gmail.com    dlkoontz@aol.com 
 
 
Attached Appendices 
Appendix A – Modernization of Sourcing of Income and Effectively Connected Income 
Regulations (Regulations under §§861 - 864) 
Appendix B – Amendment of Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) and/or Issuance of Revenue Ruling 
on Partnership Status for Certain Profit-Shifting Structures 
Appendix C – Designate Certain MNC Profit-Shifting Structures as Listed Transactions 
Appendix D – Profit-Shifting Structures Implemented Following Inversions and 
Acquisitions by Foreign Acquirers 
Appendix E – Addition of Examples to the Manufacturing Branch Rule 
Appendix F – Regulatory and Ruling Guidance Concerning Tax Treaties 
Appendix G - Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz, “Effects of New Sourcing Rule: 
ECI and Profit Shifting”, Tax Notes, May 21, 2018, p. 1119. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Modernization of Sourcing of Income and Effectively Connected Income (ECI) 
Regulations (Regulations under §§861 - 864) 
Problem: Existing income sourcing and ECI regulations are sufficient to determine, 
calculate, and impose ECI taxation for traditional (old) businesses but lack clarity when 
applied to new business models prevalent in the 21st century. These include large MNCs 
that depend on the use of digital and internet tools in their centrally managed worldwide 
business models (e.g. high-tech manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, internet-based 
companies earning advertising and commission income, etc.). The existing regulations 
need modernization to provide the IRS with another and even more effective tool to use 
against profit-shifting structures. Currently, the IRS’s primary tools to reverse profit-
shifting structures have been transfer pricing and re-characterization, both tools that are 
very subjective to apply and uncertain of success in the complex litigation that inevitably 
follows. Modernizing the rules for applying ECI taxation would hopefully encourage 
taxpayers to avoid aggressive structures and effectively add another enforcement tool for 
the IRS to apply and sustain due to ECI’s more objective, fact-based criteria. 
Solution: It is critical that sourcing and ECI regulations be updated to reflect modern-day 
business models such as supply chains, contract manufacturers, etc. Moreover, updating 
these regulations and making them consistent with other parts of the Code and 
regulations would make ECI taxation easier for both taxpayers and the IRS to apply.  
Failing to up-date these regulations will likely result in situations where ECI taxation 
should apply but which may go unrecognized by taxpayers, outside auditors, and the IRS. 
Regarding specific regulations to be modernized, the Reg. §1.864-6 rules (regarding sales 
of goods or merchandise through a U.S. office of a foreign taxpayer) focus closely on the 
sales contract and not on the many critical activities, often performed within the United 
States by related persons, that strongly support not only consummated sales but critical 
purchase and/or production functions. For example, many profit shifting structures start 
with the transfer of production intangibles to a zero- or low-taxed foreign group member 
that itself has no personnel or capacity to: 
• Conduct production through its own facilities; 
• Direct production physically performed by a contract manufacturer; 
• Control the risks associated with production or the holding of the production 
intangibles.  
Capacity to carry out these functions remains within one or more U.S. group members 
that act on behalf of the foreign group member. These U.S. group members conduct 
production operations, make day-to-day business decisions, and manage production risk 
for that foreign member. Such operations and decisions can include the contractual terms 
of agreements signed by the foreign member with component suppliers, raw material 
vendors, and contract manufacturers. It also includes decisions on production processes, 
production quantities, quality control, etc. Such functions and activities, and the 
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commercial risks that arise from them, are a crucial and critical part of any manufacturing 
business. 
This sort of profit shifting structure, voluntarily created by many MNCs seeking to shift 
profits into zero- or low-taxed foreign group members, creates solely in legal form an 
independent company that produces products and sells them. Most or all production 
functions (short of the physical manufacture that is performed by a usually unrelated 
contract manufacturer) are performed by group members in the U.S., which are 
ostensibly acting as independent contractors under a service agreement and not as an 
agent, joint venturer, or partner. 
Modernization of the §§861-864 regulations is needed to reflect the reality that U.S. 
group members are performing critical production functions and making day-to-day 
business decisions that control the potential profitability of and commercial risks borne 
by the foreign group member. Such modernization could include:6 
• Meaning of “Produced” 
Reg §1.864-1 should be amended to read: 
For purposes of sections 1.861-1 through 1.864-7, the word "sale" 
includes "exchange"; the word "sold" includes "exchanged"; the word 
"produced" includes "created", "fabricated", "manufactured", "extracted", 
"processed", "cured", "aged", and activities that constitute a	substantial 
contribution (within the meaning of section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)) to the 
manufacture, production, or construction of personal property through the 
activities of a taxpayer’s employees, agents, and related persons (within 
the meaning of section 1.954-1(f)). 
• Clarity of Engaged in Trade or Business within the United States 
Reg §1.864-2 should be amended to clarify that a foreign taxpayer having no 
capacity or personnel to conduct all or any material portion of its business or to 
manage the commercial risks of all or any material portion of its business will be 
engaged in trade or business within the U.S. when those functions or management 
of risks are conducted by one or more persons within the U.S. Such persons 
include not only agents of the foreign taxpayer, but also putative independent 
contractors (whether related or not) acting under a service or similar agreement. 
The following should be added at the end of paragraph (a) of Reg §1.864-2: 
The term also includes the performance of activities within the United 
States (for example the purchasing or production of products, the	
substantial contribution to the manufacturing of personal property within 
the meaning of section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), the sale of products, the 
maintenance and management of an internet-based platform through 																																																								6	The suggested modernizations included below assume the present regulation structure 
under §864 that have not yet been updated to reflect the addition of §865 and, in 
particular, §865(e)(2), which causes relevant sales of personal property to be U.S. source 
and therefore ECI under §864(c)(3) rather than foreign source and, as a result, covered by 
§864(c)(4)(B)(iii). 
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which sales are made or advertising or other internet based service 
revenues are earned, the rental or licensing of intangibles, etc.) by another 
person (whether related or not and including activities performed under 
any independent contractor service agreement or agency) who conducts all 
or any material portion of these activities or manages the commercial risks 
thereof for or on behalf of any taxpayer when the taxpayer itself has 
insufficient personnel or capacity to conduct all or any material portion of 
its business or manage the commercial risks thereof. The actual conduct 
and activities of the persons will control rather than any contractual label 
or description that provides, for example, that the person conducting the 
activities or managing the commercial risk is an independent contractor 
providing a service. 
• Gross Income from Internet-Based Platforms 
Many MNCs and other taxpayers conduct centrally managed worldwide 
businesses that involve the provision of digital goods and services. At the core of 
these businesses are the central ongoing decision-making concerning the business 
being conducted and the day-to-day maintenance and management of the internet 
platforms that are accessed by users globally. For many MNCs, these platforms 
were not only developed primarily within the U.S., but both the ongoing decision-
making and the platform maintenance and management are also conducted 
mostly, if not wholly, within the U.S. While users (including advertisers) from a 
particular country, territory, or region may access a platform presented in their 
local language with some localization of the products or services offered, the 
platform and the digital goods and services offered are virtually the same 
worldwide. It is MNC personnel located in the U.S. who maintain and manage 
these worldwide platforms and are the decision makers with regard to matters 
such as the products or services to be offered, the terms on which they will be 
offered including pricing, etc. 
These digital goods and services include providing advertisers and others with 
access to the MNC’s user base and information about users. They also include 
without limitation providing platforms for gig economy workers (e.g. ride 
sharing), acting as agents selling the products of others (e.g. software and non-
physical products like ebooks, music, movies, etc.), and providing cloud services. 
For some years now, the regularly issued Priority Guidance Plan has included a 
project focused on the sourcing and character of income related to digital goods 
and services. The most recent quarterly update issued on May 9, 2018, of the 
2017-2018 Priority Guidance Plan in the International section on page 23 at F.2. 
states: 
Regulations under §861 on the character of income, including income 
arising in transactions involving intellectual property and the provision of 
digital goods and services. 
The authors of this submission have no information of what is being considered 
for these future regulations. However, we believe that where an internet platform 
and the business being conducted are primarily maintained and managed from 
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within the U.S., future regulations will likely provide that some material portion 
of the revenue generated will be U.S. source gross income, irrespective of where 
in the world the user, advertiser, or customer may be. 
For prior and current years until these contemplated regulations are issued, source 
of income will be based on the existing regulations, IRS rulings, other IRS 
pronouncements, and case law. While there of course can be arguments made for 
specific taxpayer situations regarding the character of income and the source rule 
to be used, it seems that often the facts and circumstances approach of Reg 
§1.861-4(b)(1) will be the most appropriate sourcing rule to apply. Where this is 
the case, the day-to-day U.S.-based maintenance and management of the group’s 
business and internet platform will cause material amounts of U.S. source income, 
again irrespective of where in the world the user, advertiser, or other customer 
may be. 
Many MNC profit shifting structures involve the license or transfer of IP created 
primarily within the U.S. to zero- or low-taxed foreign group members. Such 
transactions provide the basis for the foreign group members to record revenues 
generated by the internet platform from digital goods and services. A transfer 
often involves first an ownership transfer of existing IP along with a cost sharing 
agreement that allows the group member participants to own their respective 
shares of future IP development for exploitation within their respective 
geographic areas. 
The foreign group member licenses or owns its IP, but it participates minimally, if 
at all, in the actual operation of the internet platform through which it earns its 
revenues from digital goods and services. Rather, one or more U.S. group 
members conduct within the U.S. the bulk or all of the maintenance and 
management of the business and platform for foreign group members (including 
management of risk of the group’s investment in the platform), presumably under 
a service or similar agreement. The foreign group member’s personnel (including 
the employees of any disregarded entity subsidiaries) are typically involved in 
marketing, customer support, logistics, and similar activities. They normally have 
neither the knowledge nor the capacity to participate in maintaining and managing 
the platform or in managing the risk of the IP they license or own. Further, they 
do not have the capability of directing an independent service provider to perform 
these functions and manage these risks. 
In these circumstances, note that under Reg §1.482-7(j)(3)(i), cost sharing 
transaction payments will be considered the payor's costs of developing 
intangibles at the location where such development is conducted. Reg §1.482-
7(j)(2)(ii) provides that a foreign participant in a cost sharing agreement will not 
be treated as engaged in trade or business within the U.S. solely by reason of its 
participation in a CSA. However, if other factors create a trade or business within 
the U.S., the paragraph (j)(3)(i) characterization rule means that the foreign 
participant is considered to directly own a share of an intangible asset (the internet 
platform) that is maintained and managed on a day-to-day basis within the U.S. 
This means that the existing regulations characterize the foreign participant as 
earning gross income from “directly-owned” assets that are part of an active 
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business being managed and conducted within the U.S. This characterization 
further supports that there must be some material amount of U.S. source income. 
Under the first bullet point above, we have suggested a change to Reg §1.864-2(a) 
that would make clear that a foreign group member earning gross income from 
digital goods and services through an internet platform that is maintained and 
managed within the U.S. as described within this bullet point will be engaged in 
trade or business within the United States. We suggest that the following 
Example (4) be added to Reg §1.864-4(b) to make clear that any U.S. source 
income earned by such a foreign group member would be effectively connected 
income. 
Example (4). In 2005, U.S. Parent (USP) and its wholly owned Foreign 
Subsidiary (FS) execute a cost sharing agreement (CSA) to develop digital 
goods and services, an internet platform, related software, and business 
processes for earning revenues worldwide from the sale, exchange, rental, 
lease, or similar transactions related to such digital goods and services. 
Under the CSA, each of USP and FS owns a share of the internet platform 
and holds the economic rights for exploitation of the developed IP within 
its respective geographic territory (for USP, North America, and for FS, 
the rest of the world). FS (including its disregarded entity subsidiaries) 
conducts marketing, customer service, logistics, and related activities 
within its territory. Under a service agreement, FS contracts with USP for 
USP to maintain and manage the internet platform that USP and FS jointly 
own. It is determined that the facts and circumstances of USP and FS 
cause FS to be engaged in trade or business within the United States under 
the provisions of section 1.864-2. FS’s income or loss from sources within 
the United States is treated as effectively connected for 2005 with the 
conduct of a business in the United States. 
• Office or Other Fixed Place of Business Within the United States 
Amend Reg §1.864-7(c) by adding the following sentence at the end of this 
paragraph. 
However, where the officers or other personnel of the domestic parent 
corporation are not only responsible for policy decisions affecting the 
related foreign sales corporation, but also conduct activities that represent 
the business of that foreign sales corporation (for example, officers or 
other personnel are involved in negotiations with major customers, 
approve the terms of specific sales contracts, manage or control the 
purchasing and sourcing of inventory property from vendors or from 
contract manufacturers, etc.) or manage its commercial risks, then that 
foreign sales corporation will be considered to have an office or other 
fixed place of business in the United States. 
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Amend Reg §1.864-7(g) by adding the following new Example (7) at the end of 
this paragraph. 
Example (7). S, a foreign corporation, is engaged in the business of 
manufacturing a microphone and selling it to customers within its 
territory, which is all countries outside North America. S is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of P, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of 
manufacturing the same microphone and selling it to customers in North 
America. The physical manufacture of the microphone is performed by an 
unrelated contract manufacturer under separate contract manufacturing 
agreements that each of P and S have executed with the contract 
manufacturer. P and S have executed a cost sharing agreement (CSA) for 
the development of the microphone and the production processes to 
produce it. 
Employees of P conduct the bulk of the development work under the CSA. 
They also conduct virtually all functions described in section 1.954-
3(a)(4)(iv)(b), which represent a substantial contribution to the 
manufacture of the microphones. The performance of these functions is 
integral and necessary for both P and S to source their respective 
microphones from the contract manufacturer. 
S does not have a fixed facility in the United States, and none of its 
employees are stationed in the United States. Officers and employees of P 
are generally responsible for the policies followed by S and are directors 
of S. S has a chief executive officer in Country A who, from its office 
therein, handles the day-to-day conduct of S's business. However, the 
chief executive officer does not have the knowledge or capability to 
perform the functions described in section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b) or to direct 
another person to do so. If P did not perform these functions, S would be 
incapable of either manufacturing, or having manufactured, the 
microphones for which it holds IP rights under the CSA. 
Based upon the facts presented, S is considered to have an office or other 
fixed place of business in the United States for purposes of this section. 
• Income, Gain, or Loss Attributable to an Office or Other Fixed Place of 
Business in the United States 
Reg. §1.864-6, which in part concerns sales of goods or merchandise through a 
U.S. office of a foreign taxpayer, focus closely on the sales contract and not on 
the many critical activities, often performed within the United States by related 
persons, that strongly support not only consummated sales but critical purchase 
and production functions. We recommend amending the first sentence of Reg 
§1.864-6(b)(2)(iii) to read as follows: 
Income, gain, or loss from sales of goods or merchandise specified in 
paragraph (b)(3) of section 1.864-5, if the office or other fixed place of 
business is involved in purchasing such goods or merchandise, conducts 
production activities with respect to such goods or merchandise (within 
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the meaning of section 1.954-3(a)(4)(i), including activities described in 
paragraph (4)(iv)(b)), or actively participates in soliciting the order, 
negotiating the contract of sale, or performing other significant services 
necessary for the consummation of the sale which are not the subject of a 
separate agreement between the seller and the buyer. 
The effect of this amendment is best illustrated by an example. Say that a zero- or 
low-taxed foreign group member sells products through an internet platform that 
is maintained and managed by a U.S. group member. The U.S. group member 
could also conduct certain product purchasing functions for the foreign group 
member. Assume that the foreign group member does not have any foreign office 
that is a material factor in the realization of income (see Reg §1.864-6(b)(3)(i)). 
Assume also that the foreign group member through its own employees (including 
the employees of any disregarded entity subsidiary) does not perform any product 
purchasing functions. 
Under the current regulation, the foreign group member takes the position that 
neither the operation of the internet platform nor the purchasing activities 
conducted by the U.S. group member cause the sales income to be attributable to 
an office or fixed place of business within the U.S. This means that even with no 
foreign office that is a material factor in the realization of income and with no 
purchasing activities performed by the foreign group member, the gross income 
from sales will not be ECI. 
With the suggested amendment of the first sentence of Reg §1.864-6(b)(2)(iii) 
(and the other suggested regulatory changes included in this submission), it will 
be clear that the sales income will be attributable to an office or fixed place of 
business within the U.S. Once this “attributable to” condition is met, the sales 
income will be U.S. source income under §865(e)(2) and ECI under §864(c)(3). 
• Production and Sale of Inventory Property (§863(b)(2)) 
With the amendment by the TCJA of §863(b), there will undoubtedly be 
significant amendments to certain of the regulations under §863. We suggest 
below several items that could be included as a part of these amendments. 
Reg §1.863-3(c)(1)(i)(A) 
Amend the first three sentences of this subclause to read: 
For purposes of this section, production activity means an activity that 
creates, fabricates, manufactures, extracts, processes, cures, or ages 
inventory including activities that constitute a	substantial contribution 
(within the meaning of section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)) to the manufacture, 
production, or construction of personal property. See section 1.864-1. 
Subject to the provisions in section 1.1502-13 or paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of 
this section, the production activities that are taken into account for 
purposes of sections 1.863-1, 1.863-2, and this section are those conducted 
directly by the taxpayer and those conducted by the taxpayer’s agents and 
related persons within the meaning of section 1.954-1(f). 
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Reg §1.863-3(c)(1)(i)(B) 
Amend the first sentence of this subclause to read: 
Subject to the provisions of section 1.1502-13 and paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of 
this section, production assets include tangible and intangible assets 
owned directly by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s agents, and related persons 
(within the meaning of section 1.954-1(f)) that are directly used to produce 
inventory described in paragraph (a) of this section. 
Reg §1.863-3(c)(1)(i)(C) 
The location of intangible production assets could be based on where the 
personnel are who perform relevant “substantial contribution” activities as 
described in Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b). 
Consideration of Alternative Manner of Apportionment 
Given the need to modernize Reg §1.863-3 to reflect new business models such as 
those using contract manufacturers and activities constituting a “substantial 
contribution to the manufacture of personal property” as described in Reg §1.954-
3(a)(4)(iv)(b), consideration should be given to an alternative method of 
apportionment when basing apportionment on the location of production assets is 
inappropriate. For example, perhaps allocations based on the location of personnel 
(whether employed by the taxpayer, its agents, or its related parties) involved in 
the Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b) production activities could be more appropriate in 
such situations. Or, the personnel costs of such production-involved persons could 
be used. 
Reg §1.863-3(g)(3) 
To make clear the application of the §863 rules to a foreign partner in a 
partnership for purposes of determining effectively connected income, add the 
following Example 3 to Reg §1.863-3(g)(3): 
Example 3. Distribution in kind to foreign partner. 
Assume the same facts as in Example 1 except that the partnership, instead 
of selling the widgets, distributes the widgets to A and B. B sells the 
widgets outside the United States through a sales office in its country of 
incorporation. In determining the effectively connected income earned by 
B on its gross profit from sales outside the United States, B is treated as 
conducting the activities of the partnership related to production of the 
distributed widgets. Accordingly, in applying this section, B is treated as 
owning its proportionate share of the partnership's production assets based 
upon its distributive share of partnership income. The source of gross 
income on the sale of the widgets is determined under section 863 and 
these regulations. B makes sales of inventory property produced in whole 
by the taxpayer within the United States and sold without the United 
States. Accordingly, income from B’s sale of widgets shall be allocated 
and apportioned between sources within and without the United States 
solely on the basis of the production activities. As all production activities 
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occur within, and all production assets are within the United States, all 
gross profits on B’s sale of widgets are sourced within the United States. 
(If B simply purchased widgets from a third party located in the US for 
sale outside the US, wouldn’t B avoid having US sourced income?) 
To make clear the application of the §863 rules to a foreign partner in a 
partnership that uses a contract manufacturer for the physical production and 
makes a substantial contribution to production within the meaning of Reg §1.954-
3(a)(4)(iv)(b), add the following Example 4 to Reg §1.863-3(g)(3): 
Example 4. Partnership makes substantial contribution to the production 
of inventory. 
Assume the same facts as in Example 3 except that the partnership, instead 
of manufacturing widgets in the partnership's plant located in the United 
States, engages an unrelated contract manufacturer in another county for 
the physical manufacture of the widgets. The partnership through its 
facilities and personnel within the United States conducts the activities 
specified in Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), thereby making a substantial 
contribution to the manufacture, production, or construction of the 
widgets. The partnership is accordingly considered to have produced the 
widgets sold. In determining the effectively connected income earned by 
B on its gross profit from sales outside the United States, B is treated as 
conducting the activities of the partnership related to production of the 
distributed widgets. The consequences described for Example 3 apply as 
well for this Example 4. 
Anti-Abuse Rules in Connection with Certain Disregarded Entities 
Our article attached to this submission as Appendix G, “Effects of New Sourcing 
Rule: ECI and Profit Shifting”, in section III discusses foreign producer sales into 
the U.S. The article explains the double non-taxation result that some foreign 
producers will have from selling foreign manufactured products into the U.S. 
through a disregarded entity (DRE) subsidiary (e.g. a limited liability company) 
that is treated as a sales branch of the foreign producer by the U.S. but as a 
separate taxpayer by the country of the producer. 
Through such a mechanism, while profit attributable to the manufacturing 
functions conducted in the producer’s home country will be subject to tax in that 
country, the profits attributable to sales activities conducted within the DRE 
subsidiary will typically go untaxed by both the producer’s home country and the 
U.S. 
Under territorial tax systems used in most producers’ home countries, there will 
typically be no home country taxation of the profits within the DRE subsidiary. 
Non-taxability by the U.S. of those same DRE subsidiary earnings is the result of 
the U.S. entity classification rules and the TCJA amendment to §863(b). Under 
that amendment, gross income from sales of property produced by a taxpayer in 
one country and sold in another is sourced solely in the location (or locations) 
where produced. As such, all gross income will be foreign source and will escape 
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effectively connected income treatment despite the foreign producer being 
engaged in trade or business within the U.S. 
Setting up a hybrid structure like this to create double non-taxation will likely be 
relatively easy for many foreign producers selling into the U.S. We strongly 
recommend that an anti-abuse rule that would override such structures be 
included in new regulations that reflect the TCJA amendment to §863(b). 
• Required Technical Correction of §864(c)(4)(D)(i) 
Code §864(c)(4)(D)(i)) provides an exception to ECI treatment when a foreign 
corporation pays dividends, interest, or royalties that are foreign source income in 
the hands of the foreign taxpayer recipient and the foreign “…taxpayer owns 
(within the meaning of section 958(a)), or is considered as owning (by applying 
the ownership rules of section 958(b)), more than 50 percent of the total combined 
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote...” 
Given the potentially expansive effect on this provision by the deletion of 
§958(b)(4), it would appear that there should be a technical correction proposed to 
make this sub-clause read: 
(i) consists of dividends, interest, or royalties paid by a foreign corporation 
in which the taxpayer owns (within the meaning of section 958(a)), or is 
considered as owning (by applying the ownership rules of section 958(b) 
as in effect before its amendment by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act), more 
than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock 
entitled to vote, or 
In order to reverse the effect of the deletion of §958(b)(4) by the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act within the regulations, Reg §1.864-5(d)(1) should be amended by adding 
the phrase “as in effect before its amendment by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 
115-97)”, so that after amendment this subparagraph reads: 
Dividends, interest, or royalties paid by a foreign corporation in which the 
nonresident alien individual or the foreign corporation described in 
paragraph (a) of this section owns, within the meaning of section 958(a), 
or is considered as owning, by applying the ownership rules of section 
958(b) as in effect before its amendment by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(P.L. 115-97), at the time such items are paid more than 50 percent of the 
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote. 
• Update of Reg §§1.864-5(d)(2)(iv) and (v) 
Reg §1.864-5(d)(2) provides an exclusion from ECI treatment for certain subpart 
F income of a CFC. One reference in this clause is to §954(c)(3) instead of 
§954(c)(2)(A). Another is to §954(c)(4) instead of §954(c)(3). These differences 
are due to subsequent reordering of the paragraphs within §954(c). Reg §§1.864-
5(d)(2)(iv) and (v) should be amended to reflect these changes so that they would 
read: 
(iv) Any income derived in the active conduct of a trade or business which 
is excluded under section 954(c)(2)(A), or 
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(v) Any income received from related persons which is excluded under 
section 954(c)(3). 
• Update of Reg §§1.864-5(b) and 1.864-6(b) 
Reg §1.864-5(b), which deals with the treatment of certain foreign source income, 
refers in subparagraph (1)(ii) to gain or loss on the sale of intangible personal 
property. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) inserted §865, which deals 
with sales of intangibles and causes §§865(d)(1)(A) and (e)(2) to govern the 
treatment of such transactions. P.L. 100-647, §1012(d)(10)(A), also amended 
§864(c)(4)(B) to eliminate coverage of such sales of intangibles by paragraph (4). 
Since §865(e)(2) can make such sales U.S. source and therefore covered by 
§864(c)(3), clause (ii) of Reg §1.864-5(b)(1) no longer has any relevance and 
should be deleted. In addition, Reg §§1.864-5(b)(3)(iii) and 1.864-6(b)(2)(i) 
should be amended to remove any reference to gains or losses on the sale or 
exchange of intangible personal property. 
If the Treasury and IRS do issue modernized regulations, they should consider issuing a 
notice as soon as possible to alert taxpayers to any planned regulatory changes. This 
could be done in a manner similar to the notices issued for inversions (i.e. Notice 2014-
52 and 2015-79) and anticipated regulations to implement certain TCJA changes. Such a 
notice could not only announce the planned amendments to the sourcing and ECI rules, 
but it could also alert taxpayers that ECI is subject to higher effective tax rates due to the 
branch profits tax (see §884) and the loss of deductions and credits and the open statute 
of limitations where no tax return has been filed (see §§882(c)(2) and 6501(c)(3)). Such 
notice(s) would strongly encourage MNCs to refrain from implementing or continuing 
profit shifting structures. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Amendment of Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) and/or Issuance of Revenue Ruling on 
Partnership Status for Certain Profit-Shifting Structures 
Problem: Many MNC profit-shifting arrangements involve U.S. and foreign group 
members that conduct joint business activities using personnel, assets, and activities of 
two or more of the group members. Despite this reality of how many MNCs are 
operating, they take the position that such group members are totally independent of each 
other. Two examples will help demonstrate this. 
First, consider an MNC that conducts a seamless worldwide business earning advertising 
revenues through a software platform, developed and expanded primarily by U.S. group 
members, that displays advertisements to the users of free services (e.g. email, search, 
etc.). While individual MNC group members record income from advertisers based on 
the advertiser’s geographic location, U.S. group members conduct within the U.S. in one 
integrated operation for all applicable group members the day-to-day management and 
functions that allow the platform to operate and generate advertising revenues worldwide. 
These day-to-day management activities and functions are the guts of business operations 
and the actual activities that earn the profits. 
Although zero- and low-taxed foreign group members, which license group IP or own it 
through cost sharing agreements, record their revenues and related expenses as if they 
were separate independent businesses, from a management and operational standpoint, 
they are not independently run businesses. Rather, they are part of one enterprise 
centrally run and conducted from within the U.S. Typically, such foreign group members 
do not have either the personnel or capabilities to conduct their own independent business 
or to even direct independent contractors acting on their behalf.  
(Note that to keep the example simple, the above paragraph assumes a platform that is 
generating advertising revenues. The example could also cover platforms such as those 
that serve the gig economy and those that sell third-party produced products on either a 
buy-and-resell or commission basis.) 
Second, using an unrelated Asian contract manufacturer, an MNC produces products for 
sale worldwide through a centrally managed supply chain. U.S. group members manage 
and conduct the bulk of the product development. Importantly, U.S. group members also 
manage and conduct the day-to-day production process itself, including functions such 
as: 
(i) Oversight and direction of production activities; 
(ii) Material selection, vendor selection, control of raw materials, work-in- 
process, or finished goods; 
(iii) Management of manufacturing costs or capacities; 
(iv) Control of manufacturing-related logistics; and 
(v) Quality control. 
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The MNC makes product sales through a number of sales channels. One channel is large 
volume sales made to major multinational customers and distributors around the world. 
Personnel within the U.S. not only set group-wide sales policy, but they may also be 
involved in maintaining relationships and negotiating sales terms with these major 
customers and distributors. Another channel involves sales made through a software 
platform used worldwide, for which U.S. group members conduct within the U.S. for all 
group members the day-to-day management and functions that allow the platform to 
operate and make sales. Despite this critical involvement of U.S. group members, sales to 
all foreign customers and distributors are recorded within zero- and low-taxed foreign 
group members. Such group members may provide local warehousing and other 
customer, logistical, and technical support, but they do not have the personnel or 
capability to independently conduct their own business. They are unable to direct the U.S. 
group members that are nominally acting as independent contractors, but that are in 
reality conducting crucial sales and production management, decision-making, and 
operational functions for the benefit of all group members making product sales. 
(Note that this second example has been described as one that involves tangible inventory 
property. It could also involve the sale of intangible inventory property such as group-
produced software.) 
Although operationally the above two MNC group examples each conduct a globally 
seamless and centrally managed joint business, there is no overt partnership, joint 
venture, or similar contract governing the manner in which the group members conduct 
their joint business. Rather, each group member contracts separately with third parties 
(e.g. customers, raw material and component vendors, contract manufacturers, etc.) to 
give the legal appearance of separate and independently operating companies. Reflecting 
the reality that many functions benefiting zero- or low-tax foreign group members are 
being conducted by U.S. group members, intercompany service and similar agreements 
are executed that treat the U.S. group members as independent contractors and not as 
agents, partners, or joint venturers. 
Solution: As covered in detail within the undersigned’s article on unexpected partnership 
status, the above-described MNC profit shifting structures often create separate entities 
for federal tax purposes under Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2). Under the Reg §301.7701-3(b) 
default rules, these separate entities are characterized as partnerships.  
It will be useful to contrast today’s business models such as those described above with 
multinational businesses of decades ago that had a much different format than what has 
become so common today. Under this decades-old format, a U.S. parent company set 
group policies and provided oversight over its subsidiaries. However, these subsidiaries 
had a full complement of their own corporate officers (e.g. CEO, operations director, 
sales director, finance director, etc.) working from the subsidiary’s facilities. The 
subsidiaries were truly standalone operations. Real on-the-ground management was an 
absolute necessity given the pre-internet communications and other technologies of the 
time (e.g. the telephone, telex, and fax machines). Enterprise software was in its infancy 
and even email did not emerge as a business communications device until the 1990s. 
Given these independently run subsidiaries, there were not sufficient “joint business 
activities” that would ever cause any separate entity for tax purposes or a partnership. 
The issue simply didn’t arise. 
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Today, however, there is no longer any need for each subsidiary to have a full 
complement of its own corporate officers. The technology advances of the past several 
decades have allowed both a true centralized management and an isolation of specific and 
often narrow business functions that contribute to one worldwide business. The 
subsidiaries are each contributing to the group’s worldwide business; they are no longer 
conducting their own independent businesses. The rise of supply chains where various 
functions occurring in different locations all contribute to one worldwide business is just 
one example. Another is the centralized management and operation of a worldwide 
internet-based business. Today’s reality within many, if not most, MNCs is actual joint 
business activities and integrated management and operations. 
Over the past several decades, the now commonly used centralized management of 
worldwide business has become the norm. It is easier, more cost effective, and 
commercially viable to manage and control a world-wide business using a management 
structure that relies on integrated technology and that directs personnel, assets, and 
activities located around the world toward a common goal. The reality of this centralized 
management of group members and each member’s sometimes narrow contribution to 
the group’s worldwide business falls squarely within the applicable rules to create a 
separate entity and a partnership for tax purposes. 
Once the relationship between the U.S. and foreign group members is determined to be a 
partnership, there are several consequences. 
• The U.S. and foreign group members are partners with the activities conducted 
and the assets used in that business considered to be those of the partnership and 
no longer the activities and assets of the respective partners. With the partnership 
carrying on a business through one or more U.S. offices, the foreign group 
member partners are similarly conducting a trade or business in the U.S. 
(§875(1)), which is the threshold test for applying the effectively connected 
income rules (§864(c)). Application of the ECI rules will be clear and 
unambiguous. 
• Both partnership filing and §1446 withholding will apply. 
Given both the important deterrence effect that partnership status will have on aggressive 
profit shifting structures and the important tool it represents for the government in its 
efforts to attack such structures, the authors recommend one, or, preferably, two actions. 
First, the Treasury and the IRS should make appropriate regulation amendments. Second, 
they should issue one or more revenue rulings that find separate entity and partnership 
status for relevant group members in certain profit shifting structures. 
Amendment of Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) 
We suggest that Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) be amended to read as follows: 
A separate entity for federal tax purposes shall include a joint venture or other 
arrangement, whether or not evidenced by a contract or other written agreement, 
through or by means of which the participants carry on any business, financial 
operation, or venture. For example, a separate entity exists for federal tax 
purposes if co-owners of an apartment building lease space and in addition 
provide services to the occupants either directly or through an agent. On the other 
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hand, mere co-ownership of property that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented 
or leased does not constitute a separate entity for federal tax purposes. A joint 
undertaking merely to share expenses does not create a separate entity for federal 
tax purposes. For example, if two or more persons jointly construct a ditch merely 
to drain surface water from their properties, they have not created a separate entity 
for federal tax purposes. Similarly, if an individual owner, or tenants in common, 
of farm property lease it to a farmer for a cash rental or a share of the crops, they 
do not necessarily create a separate entity for federal tax purposes. Participants, 
however, may create a separate entity for federal tax purposes if they actively 
carry on a trade, business, financial operation, venture, or any portion thereof and 
divide in any manner the profits or the products or other results thereof. Such a 
trade, business, financial operation, or venture may include, for example, (i) the 
joint production of inventory property, whether tangible or intangible, where the 
participants take in-kind or dispose of their shares of any property produced, 
extracted, or used, or (ii) the joint conduct of an internet platform-based business 
(e.g. giving advertisers access to platform users or providing cloud or other 
services including, for example, providing software and applications to users and 
acting as a sales agent or intermediary between users and third-party providers). 
The above recommended language does two things. First, it adds examples that take into 
account modern business models using digital technologies. Second, it moves and 
expands the phrase “divide the profits therefrom”. 
While the addition of modern business model examples is self-explanatory, the 
movement and expansion of the “profits” phrase deserves some explanation. 
The first sentence of present Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) reads: 
A joint venture or other contractual arrangement may create a separate entity for 
federal tax purposes if the participants carry on a trade, business, financial 
operation, or venture and divide the profits therefrom. [Emphasis added.] 
This sentence implies that for a separate entity to exist for federal tax purposes, the 
arrangement amongst the participants must have profits (or presumably losses) that are 
shared in some manner between them. Importantly, this implication is neither consistent 
with other Code and regulatory provisions nor with the historical regulations on which 
the current Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) is based. 
Regarding this inconsistency with other Code and regulatory provisions, first note 
§§761(a) and 7701(a)(2) that provide, with only minor language differences: 
For purposes of this subtitle, the term ‘‘partnership’’ includes a syndicate, group, 
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of 
which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, 
within the meaning of this title, a corporation or a trust or estate. 
Focusing solely on this statutory language, joint production alone carried out by MNC 
group members reasonably falls within ‘‘any business, financial operation, or venture.’’ 
This is made 100% certain by §761(a)(2), which effectively states that an organization 
that is availed of “for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, but not for the 
purpose of selling services or property produced or extracted” may elect to be excluded 
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from the application of all or part of subchapter K. If such an organization were not a 
partnership covered by subchapter K in the first place, it would not be necessary to have a 
specific provision allowing it to elect out of subchapter K. The point here, of course, is 
that an arrangement in which two or more participants solely produce inventory property 
with each participant taking its share in-kind will have no revenues from joint sales or 
services. As such, it will have no profit to share amongst the participants. Hence, without 
question, a separate entity for federal tax purposes can exist without the sharing of 
profits. 
Note that even if this §761(a)(2) were not already a 100% certainty for joint production, 
for any MNC group members that also conduct joint sales, licensing, and service 
activities, these joint activities absolutely fall within these statutory provisions. 
We stated above that there is also an inconsistency between the current regulation (Reg 
§301.7701-1(a)(2)) and the historical regulation on which the current regulation is based. 
This inconsistency directly involves the phrase “divide the profits therefrom”. 
Specifically, to repeat, the first sentence of Reg §301.7701-1(a)(2) is: 
A joint venture or other contractual arrangement may create a separate entity for 
federal tax purposes if the participants carry on a trade, business, financial 
operation, or venture and divide the profits therefrom. [Emphasis added.] 
This placement of the “divide the profits” phrase makes it appear that the existence of 
profits and their being divided amongst the participants is a condition for there to be a 
separate entity for federal tax purposes. By contrast, the pre-1997 regulation (Reg 
§301.7701- 3(a)) from which this language was taken reads, in part: 
(a) In general. The term ‘‘partnership’’ is broader in scope than the common law 
meaning of partnership and may include groups not commonly called 
partnerships. Thus, the term ‘‘partnership’’ includes a syndicate, group, pool, 
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which 
any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not a 
corporation or a trust or estate. . . . Mere co-ownership of property which is 
maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not constitute a partnership. . 
. . Tenants in common, however, may be partners if they actively carry on a trade, 
business, financial operation, or venture and divide the profits thereof. For 
example, a partnership exists if co-owners of an apartment building lease space 
and in addition provide services to the occupants either directly or through an 
agent. [Emphasis added.] 
This “divide the profits” phrase was previously only a means of distinguishing within the 
regulation one example of a situation involving co-ownership of property and did not 
modify the basic definition of a partnership, which was: “a syndicate, group, pool, joint 
venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any 
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on.” This use in one example was, of 
course, fully consistent with the statutory definitions in both §§761(a) and 7701(a)(2), 
neither of which included any “divide the profits” requirement and neither of which was 
changed when the current regulation was promulgated in 1997. 
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By moving this “divide the profit” phrase to the first sentence in Reg §301.7701-2(a), it 
became in appearance a principal part of the definition of a separate entity for federal tax 
purposes, and thus narrowed the meaning of that term.  
Was there any intention when the new 1997 the check-the-box regulations were issued to 
actually change the meaning, or at least the emphasis, of the definition of separate entity 
for federal tax purposes and narrow it through the addition of this “divide the profit” 
phrase? 
We believe there was no such intention for any change that would narrow the meaning. 
First, of course, the statutory definition of “partnership” of many decades had not 
changed in either of §§761(a) or 7701(a)(2). Thus, there was no authority for any 
narrowing of the definition of “partnership” or the term “separate entity for federal tax 
purposes”, which is critical for defining the classification of entities under the new check-
the-box regulations. Second, with the overall intention of the 1997 check-the-box 
regulations being simplification, the Treasury and IRS were likely just cleaning up the 
language of the reconfigured regulations without intending any change of meaning. 
Interest in Partnership for Determining Distributive Share (§704(b)) 
As indicated earlier, the statutory definition of partnership, and by extension the 
definition of a separate entity for federal tax purposes, is very broad and includes 
organizations established under applicable local law and those established through 
contracts and the joint actions of the parties. The MNC group member relationships 
briefly described in the above examples are established through the operating joint 
activities of the parties and by other relevant factors, including verbal understandings, 
internal group policies, management lines of authority, and intercompany contracts — 
including any licensing and cost sharing agreements as well as any intercompany service 
agreements under which U.S. group members provide services to foreign group members. 
All of these will be factors in defining each participant’s interest in the separate entity for 
federal tax purposes, and thus each participant’s interest in the partnership for 
determining its distributive share under §704(b). 
Consideration should be given to adding guidance and examples to Reg §1.704-1. 
First, as a simplified approach that would be practical and easy to apply, the partnership 
profits (i.e., generally the combined profits of the joint business conducted by the group 
member partners) could be apportioned each year based on some appropriate factor(s) 
that each group member partner brings into the partnership. These factors could include, 
for example, the year’s average net assets, average personnel, average compensation, 
gross income from sales, etc. An additional factor that could often be relevant would be 
cumulative R&D expenses to reflect the contribution of intangibles.7 Where production 
occurs through use of a contract manufacturer and group personnel are performing the 
functions described in Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), the personnel performing these 
manufacturing functions may be quite important and indicative of what each group 																																																								7	Note that where a partnership is found, any CSA that the partners may have executed 
would no longer be recognized since all relevant activities would be treated as occurring 
within the partnership, which is a single taxpayer. A CSA requires that there be two or 
more taxpayers.	
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member partner contributes to the partnership with net assets having little relevance. For 
many profit shifting structures, the zero- or low-taxed foreign group members will likely 
bring little or nothing into the partnership in the way of many of these factors. 
A possible second approach would be to determine partner interest-in-the-partnership 
percentages as of the creation of the partnership. Those percentages would then be 
applied to the partnership profits for each subsequent year. Such percentages could be 
based on the original terms of the intercompany agreements executed among the group 
members when the partnership was created (i.e. likely at the same time that the group 
initiated its profit shifting structure). The terms of those various agreements (cost sharing 
agreement, any licensing agreements, intercompany service agreements, etc.) should 
reflect any IRS transfer pricing adjustments or advance pricing agreement that may have 
been obtained by the group. 
A third approach would be to apportion the partnership profits by determining for each 
year each partner’s interest-in-the-partnership, and thus its distributive share, based on 
the various written agreements between them (e.g. the cost sharing agreement, service 
agreements, etc.) and each partner’s separate agreements with third parties (e.g. 
customers, contract manufacturers, suppliers, etc.). 
Issuance of Revenue Rulings 
We recommend that one or more revenue rulings be issued that prescribe when a joint 
business conducted by an MNC’s group members shall create a partnership for tax 
purposes with those group members as the partners and their separate activities, which 
are limited to those activities that are part of the joint business, being treated as activities 
of the partnership. Such guidance for certain profit shifting structures should be a simple 
approach to demonstrating the government’s resolve to fight artificial profit shifting 
structures. 
One or more revenue rulings could also explore the issue of what group members’ 
activities might be factually included within the joint business, and therefore included as 
activities of the partnership and not the separate activities of any partner. In addition to 
activities such as joint purchasing, production, and sales activities, research and 
development benefiting all group member partners would be included as well. As noted 
above in footnote 7, when so included, a ruling could provide that any cost sharing 
agreement signed by the group member partners would be no longer recognized for tax 
purposes. 
Article 3 in footnote 3 provides detailed information from which a ruling may be drafted. 
The writers of this letter would be pleased to provide further guidance if it would be 
helpful. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Designate Certain MNC Profit-Shifting Structures as Listed Transactions 
Many MNC profit-shifting structures exhibit three factors that suggest the existence of a 
U.S. trade or business, a partnership, and ECI. The three factors are: 
(a) Critical value-drivers performed predominantly by U.S. group members; 
(b) Extensive U.S.-located control and decision-making that far exceed what 
would be found in typical unrelated-party situations; and 
(c) A lack of capable foreign member management personnel and no CEO or 
similar position within the foreign group member who in substance runs that 
entity’s worldwide business from an office outside the U.S. 
We suggest that profit-shifting structures with these characteristics be designated as a 
“listed transaction” under Reg §1.6011-4(b)(2). If so designated, all parties will be on 
notice concerning the various penalty and disclosure requirements that apply to taxpayers 
that fail to report relevant income and pay tax. This should encourage some MNCs and 
their advisors to change or unwind existing profit-shifting structures as well as 
discouraging the creation of new structures. It should also discourage professional firms 
from pushing risky structures on existing and potential clients due to the disclosure and 
penalties applicable to any material advisor. 
If for any reason it is determined that it is not possible to designate these structures as 
“listed transactions”, they could be designated as “transactions of interest” under Reg 
§1.6011-4(b)(6). 
Whether or not it is decided to designate certain profit-shifting structures as listed 
transactions or transactions of interest, and to the extent that doing so would not require 
Congressional action, consideration should be given to providing administrative relief to 
unwind profit-shifting structures so as to encourage compliance and self-reporting of 
prior years’ tax obligations on amended or late filings through abatement of penalties 
and/or other amounts that might otherwise be due. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Profit-Shifting Structures Implemented Following Inversions and Acquisitions by 
Foreign Acquirers 
There have been and continue to be both inversion transactions and acquisitions of U.S.-
based MNCs by foreign persons (including foreign acquisition vehicles owned by U.S. 
private equity funds). In all of these cases, following the inversion or acquisition, there 
are considerable tax-motivations to transfer U.S.-owned intangible assets to foreign group 
members and to establish profit-shifting structures that route profits to group members 
that are not CFCs. 
Treasury and the IRS should consider issuing one or more notices to make clear that 
following any such inversion or acquisition the valuation of any transferred assets and the 
potential for ECI and earnings stripping will be priorities for examination. This could also 
be made a part of the LB&I Campaign program. 
The following paragraphs include two examples. The first clearly illustrates post 
acquisition transfers of U.S. intangibles and related issues. The second, while not a tax 
case, illustrates how the acquisition of IP may be an important motivation for a foreign 
acquirer. In such cases, IRS examinations should be looking not only for undervaluation 
of IP transfers, but also for unrecorded transfers where acquirer group members merely 
start using the IP in their other products. This may have occurred in this Segway 
example. 
Example 1 – Valeant Pharmaceuticals International 
The first and perhaps best example is Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, a Canadian 
public company listed in the U.S. that is the result of a 2010 inversion. Interestingly, 
because Valeant was invited on July 30, 2015, to testify before the Senate Homeland 
Security and Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (“PSI”), there is 
significant internal company information on tax avoidance involved in Valeant’s 
acquisitions of U.S. groups (including, for example, Salix Pharmaceuticals (2015) and 
Bausch and Lomb (2013)).8 
The PSI Majority Staff Report,9 on pages 12 through 31 provides significant detail on 
how Valeant transferred intangibles owned by the acquired companies out of the U.S. 
shortly after each acquisition and set up profit-shifting arrangements. Not only is there 
the issue of valuation for transferred intangibles, which were transferred to an Irish 
subsidiary, but with the apparent lack of any change in the conduct of the acquired 
companies’ businesses, it is likely that the Irish company has significant taxable ECI 
following the transfer of these intangible assets. 
																																																								8	All PSI hearing documents are available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/impact-of-the-us-
tax-code-on-the-market-for-corporate-control-and-jobs	9	Available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=2C48E3A3-AFBE-43CB-
8F05-0996EAAFCDF7	
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Example 2 – Segway 
Turning to another U.S. taxpayer, on September 9, 2014, Segway Inc. filed a trade 
complaint10 against a number of companies, most of which are Chinese. The basis for the 
trade complaint was that the respondents were importing products that infringed various 
Segway patents. Later in April 2015, it was announced that one of the Chinese 
respondents, Ninebot Inc., would acquire Segway.11 An interview with a co-founder of 
the acquirer stated:  
The primary benefit of buying Segway is the patents. … Ninebot is still young, as 
is Xiaomi [a major Chinese company partially funding Ninebot], so we can’t 
successfully apply for many patents. Segway has the core patents for the self-
balancing vehicle industry, so this acquisition will help us with our patents a lot.12 
It seems likely that in many acquisitions like this, there may be not only undervalued 
transfers of intangibles to foreign acquirers, but there may be many undocumented 
transfers of designs, processes, and patent rights to foreign acquirers. IRS audit activity 
must identify such transferred intangibles and discourage such transfers through giving 
notice to applicable taxpayers of this priority. 
The TechCrunch piece cited in footnote 8 commented regarding Xiaomi: 
This marks the latest in a series of hardware and Internet of Things investments 
by Xiaomi, which has also given funding to companies like Misfit, Pebbles 
Interfaces, and iHealth Labs. Alliances with these startups can potentially help 
Xiaomi build its e-commerce unit, which, along with Internet services and 
hardware like its smartphones, form the core parts of its business. 
  
																																																								10	Available at http://www.itcblog.com/images/segwaycomplaintLR.pdf	11	Shu, “Beijing-based Ninebot Acquires Segway, Raises $80M From Xiaomi And 
Sequoia”, TechCrunch (April 15, 2015), available at 
http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/15/ninebot-segways-into-the-future/.	12	Horwitz, “The founder of China’s Ninebot says he bought Segway for the patents”, 
TechinAsia (April 17, 2015), available at https://www.techinasia.com/founder-chinas-
ninebot-bought-segway-patents.	
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APPENDIX E 
 
Addition of Examples to the Manufacturing Branch Rule 
Article 6 listed in footnote 3 notes how the manufacturing branch rule may apply to cause 
some gross income not caught by the ECI rules to be subpart F income. This treatment is 
not sufficiently clear in existing regulations and we suggest the following examples be 
added to the regulations as set out below. 
In brief, assume that the facts underlying an MNC’s profit shifting structure cause there 
to be an unanticipated partnership for U.S. tax purposes with U.S. group members and 
zero- or low-taxed foreign group members as partners. An explanation of why this may 
be likely is covered in Appendix B of this submission. 
Although the MNC group uses one or more unrelated Asian contract manufacturers for 
the physical production of inventory property, the joint production activities of the group 
members conducted through the partnership meet the requirements of Reg §1.954-
3(a)(4)(iv)(a) so that the inventory property sold by the partnership is considered 
manufactured, produced, or constructed by the partnership, and in turn by the CFC 
partners (Reg §1.954-3(a)(6)). As a result of this, the manufacturing branch rule of Reg 
§1.954-3(b)(1)(ii) applies. Note the last sentence of subparagraph (a) of Reg §1.954-
3(b)(1)(ii), which reads: 
… The provisions of this paragraph (b)(1)(ii) will apply only if the controlled 
foreign corporation (including any branches or similar establishments of such 
controlled foreign corporation) manufactures, produces, or constructs such 
personal property within the meaning of paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section, or 
carries on growing or extracting activities with respect to such personal property. 
Example 1 – All Manufacturing Performed in U.S. 
Assume first that all of the partnership’s production activities within the meaning of Reg 
§1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b) occur at offices and other facilities within the U.S. so that each CFC 
partner “carries on [through the partnership] manufacturing, producing, constructing, 
growing, or extracting activities by or through a branch or similar establishment located 
outside the country under the laws of which such corporation is created or organized”. 
Also assume that some portion of the partnership’s sales are made for use, consumption, 
or disposition outside the U.S. 
Before the TCJA and its amendment of §863(b), gross income from the production of 
inventory property within the U.S. and its sale outside the U.S. was sourced through one 
of several regulatory approaches that sourced a portion of the gross profit based on the 
taxpayer’s production activities and the remainder based on the taxpayer’s sales 
activities. After this TCJA amendment of §863(b), all (100%) of the gross profit is 
sourced at the location(s) of production. 
Prior to the TCJA §863(b) amendment, the manufacturing branch rule is relevant for this 
Example 1, which involves production activities solely within the U.S. This is because 
the pre-TCJA partnership will have some foreign source income due to sales made 
outside the U.S. Because this foreign source gross income is not ECI and therefore could 
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not be directly taxable to a CFC partner, this foreign source income must be subjected to 
subpart F analysis. After the TCJA, with 100% of the gross profit based at the location of 
production, all gross profit under the facts of this Example 1 will be ECI, thereby causing 
subpart F and the manufacturing branch rule to no longer be relevant. (However, see 
Example 2 below with different facts where the manufacturing branch rule is relevant 
post-TCJA.) 
With the partnership’s manufacturing branch being located in the U.S., the manufacturing 
branch rule (Reg §1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(b)) is applied to pre-TCJA years by comparing the 
effective tax rate on the relevant foreign source sales income with 30%. This 30% is the 
lower of 90% of, or 5 percentage points less than, the 35% U.S. tax rate that existed prior 
to the TCJA. If the actual taxes imposed are less than 30%, the manufacturing branch rule 
applies to relevant foreign sales income that would otherwise be caught by the Code 
§954(d)(1) definition of foreign base company sales income (FBCSI). 
Note that not all foreign source income will be FBCSI. For example, say that the 
partnership (or a low-taxed foreign member partner) has a sales office in Singapore. In 
that case, inventory property sold for use, consumption, or disposition within Singapore 
would not be caught by the Code §954(d)(1) FBCSI definition. However, sales into 
nearby Malaysia where there is no sales office would be caught. 
Example 2 – Manufacturing Performed Both Within and Without the U.S. 
Assume now that 50% of the partnership’s production activities for certain personal 
property occurs at offices and other facilities within the U.S. and 50% for that personal 
property occurs at offices in China adjacent to the facilities of an unrelated contract 
manufacturer. All activities performed by the partnership within the U.S. and in China are 
those described in Reg §1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b) and the partnership (and each CFC partner) 
is considered to have manufactured these items of personal property under Reg §1.954-
3(a)(4)(iv)(a). The countries of incorporation of the CFC partners are zero- or low-taxed 
countries other than the U.S. or China. Through these U.S. and Chinese facilities, the 
partnership (and each CFC partner) “carries on manufacturing, producing, constructing, 
growing, or extracting activities by or through a branch or similar establishment located 
outside the country under the laws of which such corporation is created or organized”. 
The partnership makes sales both within and outside the U.S. 
With production activities being conducted both within and outside the U.S., under 
§863(b), whether prior to or following the above-mentioned TCJA §863(b) amendment, 
some portion of the gross income earned will be foreign source and, therefore, not ECI. 
With this foreign source income not being directly taxable ECI to any CFC partner, this 
foreign source income must be subjected to subpart F analysis. 
The facts of this Example 2 make Reg §1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(c)(3) applicable, which provides 
in part: 
This paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(c)(3) applies to determine the location of manufacture, 
production, or construction of personal property for purposes of applying 
paragraph (b)(1)(i)(b) or (b)(1)(ii)(b) of this section where more than one branch 
or similar establishment of a controlled foreign corporation, or one or more 
branches or similar establishments of a controlled foreign corporation and the 
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remainder of the controlled foreign corporation, each engage in manufacturing, 
producing, or constructing activities with respect to the same item of personal 
property which is then sold by the controlled foreign corporation. … 
Without going into unnecessary detail, Reg §1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(c)(3) includes a number of 
examples that cover various possible factual situations involving a CFC’s production 
activities in multiple locations and the use of unrelated contract manufacturers. 
Understandably, the examples consider situations involving one CFC with multiple 
operating locations and with its own personnel in each such location. None of the 
examples specifically consider a situation where multiple CFCs are conducting joint 
business operations in a manner that has created a partnership for tax purposes. 
Simple Addition to Reg §1.954-3 
Many MNC profit shifting structures implemented over the past two decades involve 
multiple group members (including both U.S. group members and CFCs) that conduct 
portions of a centrally managed and conducted worldwide business that is seamless to 
vendors, customers, and other third parties. As discussed in Appendix B, despite the lack 
of any partnership or joint venture agreement, the joint business activities conducted by 
these group members will often create a separate entity for federal tax purposes and a 
partnership under the Reg §301.7701-1 to -3 entity classification rules. Given such 
unanticipated partnerships, it is important to add clarity to Reg §1.954-3 such that 
taxpayers have increased guidance and the IRS has more specificity in taxing aggressive 
profit shifting structures that involve such jointly conducted businesses. 
We believe that such clarity may be added to Reg §1.954-3 by adding the following 
example to Reg §1.954-3(a)(6): 
Example. USP, a U.S. corporation, wholly owns CFC, a controlled foreign 
corporation organized under the laws of Country A. It has been determined that 
USP and CFC conduct their centrally managed worldwide business in a manner 
that creates a separate entity for federal tax purposes under section 301.7701-
1(a)(2) and a partnership under the section 301.7701-3(b) default rules 
(Partnership Y). As a result of this partnership classification, all assets, personnel, 
and activities involved in the joint production and sales are considered the assets, 
personnel, and activities of Partnership Y and not the assets, personnel, or 
activities of either partner. 
Through offices, facilities, and employees within the United States and Country 
B, Partnership Y performs activities within both countries that constitute the 
manufacture of Product P, within the meaning of paragraph (a)(4) of this section 
(including paragraph (a)(4)(iv)), if performed directly by CFC. Partnership Y, 
through its sales office in Country D, sells Product P to unrelated customers in 
Country E, a country in which Partnership Y maintains no sales branch. 
CFC’s distributive share of Partnership Y’s sales income must be analyzed to 
determine whether it is foreign base company sales income taking into account all 
of section 1.954-3 including both the manufacturing exception of paragraph (a)(4) 
and the branch rules of paragraph (b). 	 	
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APPENDIX F 
 
Regulatory and Ruling Guidance Concerning Tax Treaties 
There has been significant profit shifting out of the U.S. and erosion of the U.S. tax base 
by both MNCs based in the U.S. and MNCs based abroad. Those based abroad include 
inverted MNCs, private equity acquisitions through foreign acquisition vehicles, and 
legitimate foreign-based groups. In some cases, such profit shifting has taken advantage 
of U.S. tax treaty provisions to reduce or eliminate withholding taxes or to apply treaty 
rules such as permanent establishment definitions in place of the lower-threshold 
standard of “engaged in trade or business within the United States”. 
Brief Background on Common Situations Involving Taxpayer Abuse of Treaties 
• Structures that Shift Business and Intangible Profits  
With U.S.-based MNCs and some MNCs based abroad, especially inverted MNCs 
and private-equity structures, the foreign group member that is the “taxpayer” for 
U.S. tax purposes is a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) that is operating 
through one or more disregarded entity (DRE) subsidiaries. Some of those DRE 
subsidiaries are established in countries with which the U.S. maintains tax 
treaties. While such a DRE subsidiary is a bona-fide legal entity, fully respected 
as a separate taxable entity by its country of formation, it is treated solely for U.S. 
tax purposes as not existing and as a branch or division of its CFC owner, i.e., not 
an “entity”. Accordingly, the U.S. views all DRE subsidiary personnel, assets, and 
activities as being employed, owned, and conducted by the CFC. 
As an example, assume that a U.S.-based MNC has established a CFC in a tax 
haven such as Bermuda. As that CFC has few or no employees of its own, it 
conducts business through subsidiaries in other countries for which check-the-box 
elections have been made to treat them as DRE subsidiaries. As a result of this 
structure, from a U.S. tax perspective, the only “taxpayer” is the Bermuda CFC. 
And that CFC operates through branches/divisions within the various countries 
where the DRE subsidiaries employ personnel, own assets, and conduct their 
respective operations. Those branches and divisions are not considered to be 
“entities” for U.S. tax purposes. 
The authors of this submission have written a number of articles (see footnote 3) 
describing some structures through which MNCs have shifted business and profits 
from intangible assets out of the U.S. and into zero- and low-taxed group 
members, one of which may be a CFC while others are DRE subsidiaries of that 
CFC. An important focus of these articles has been the possible application of 
effectively connected income taxation to some portion of these shifted profits 
(§864(c)). Typically, these profit shifting structures not only shift profits out of 
the U.S. They also shift profits out of the foreign countries in which they operate 
through DRE subsidiaries. As a result, these structures normally bear very low 
levels of foreign taxation. 
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ECI taxation requires that the foreign taxpayer (i.e., the CFC in this case) be 
engaged in a trade or business within the U.S. (§864(b)). Where a tax treaty 
properly applies, this “trade or business within the U.S.” threshold is replaced by 
the permanent establishment definition included in the treaty. Further, where there 
is a permanent establishment and some amount of ECI is present, it is taxable at 
the normal corporate rate (pre-TCJA 35%, post-TCJA 21%). In addition, the 
branch profits tax (§884) applies at rate of 30% to the calculated dividend 
equivalent amount. If a tax treaty were to apply, then that 30% branch profits tax 
may be reduced or eliminated if the treaty specifies a lower rate or exemption. 
• Structures Involving Interest, Royalties, and Dividends 
DRE Subsidiaries. In addition to business income, DRE subsidiaries may license 
IP for use in the U.S. or loan money to U.S. persons, thereby earning U.S. source 
royalties and/or interest. A DRE subsidiary might also invest in the shares of non-
related U.S. companies, thereby earning U.S. source dividends. Where a DRE 
subsidiary is established in a country with which the U.S. maintains a tax treaty, it 
might maintain that it should receive a reduction or elimination of the 30% 
withholding tax that applies under domestic law to these types of payments. 
Other Foreign Entities. Foreign-based MNCs have aggressively eroded the U.S. 
tax base through interest and royalties charged to their U.S. operating subsidiaries. 
Concern about this has resulted in the TCJA adding new §59A, the base erosion 
minimum tax. This sort of base erosion by foreign-based MNCs normally does 
not involve either CFCs or DRE subsidiaries. It does, though, often involve 
routing interest and royalties though structures that arguably provide tax treaty 
benefits that reduce or eliminate the 30% U.S. withholding tax while avoiding any 
significant tax in the country of the treaty partner. 
The U.S. enters into treaties to prevent double taxation; not to provide the opportunity for 
double non-taxation. Despite this, we see situations where taxpayers go through 
complicated structuring that arguably allows them to claim inappropriate treaty benefits. 
Most commonly, this means that they claim a treaty benefit from the U.S. while the 
relevant income is not taxed in the other treaty country on a normal resident basis. Thus, 
the sorts of profit-shifting structures and channeling of income from U.S. sources 
described above are normally only set up in treaty countries that offer special 
arrangements under which only a mere fraction (if any) of the normal resident tax is 
imposed. Well-known examples include Ireland and Luxembourg. Both have been 
documented as agreeing to special rulings and artificial practices that allow zero or little 
taxation far below the domestic effective corporate rates that apply to resident taxpayers. 
These special arrangements and low effective tax rates were not what U.S. treaty 
negotiators agreed to nor what the Senate thought it was ratifying. 
The example within the first bullet point above assumes that the CFC is established in 
Bermuda, which maintains no tax treaty with the U.S. The CFC could also have been 
established in a country with which the U.S. maintains a tax treaty such as the U.K., 
Ireland, Switzerland, etc. In such cases, all (or virtually all) of the operating income is 
earned not within the CFC itself, but rather within the CFC’s DRE subsidiaries. As such, 
that operating income would not be reported in the tax returns that the CFC submits to its 
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own tax authorities in, say, the U.K. Further, due to the territorial tax systems and other 
exemptions and special rules employed by many countries, DRE subsidiary earnings 
actually distributed to the CFC typically go untaxed in the CFC’s country of 
establishment. 
Say that this CFC established in the U.K. claims that the activities of its DRE subsidiaries 
do not cause a permanent establishment in the U.S. under the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty. Or, 
say that the CFC has ECI and files a U.S. tax return to report profits earned within its 
DRE subsidiaries, but claims that the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty reduces the 30% branch profits 
tax to 5%. With the relevant income for which the CFC is claiming benefits under the 
U.S.-U.K. tax treaty not being reported within any U.K. tax filings, it is inappropriate for 
treaty benefits to be granted. 
It could also occur that a DRE subsidiary claims tax treaty benefits based on the U.S. 
treaty with the country of establishment of the DRE subsidiary. This could occur, for 
example, where the DRE subsidiary claims that it has no permanent establishment within 
the U.S. or that the 30% branch profits tax should be reduced or exempted. It could also 
occur where the DRE subsidiary claims treaty reductions in the 30% U.S. withholding tax 
on dividends, interest, and royalties. Often, such claims involve taxpayer abuse that seeks 
benefits not anticipated by either U.S. treaty negotiators or the Senate. 
The second bullet point also notes the inappropriate use of tax treaties by foreign-based 
MNCs to erode the U.S. tax base. CFCs and DRE subsidiaries are often not involved in 
such claims for treaty benefits. 
Discussion 
Fiscally Transparent Entities. Our belief is that such above-described abusive situations 
involving a CFC taxpayer that conducts business operations or records transactions 
(including investments, loans, licenses, etc.) through DRE subsidiaries should never 
receive any treaty benefits, either at the CFC level or at the level of any DRE subsidiary. 
(The only exception might be where the DRE subsidiary is incorporated within the same 
country as the CFC for solely non-tax reasons and tax on a normal resident basis is being 
paid to that country by both the CFC and the DRE subsidiary.) Almost without exception, 
schemes involving CFCs and DRE subsidiaries have been carefully crafted to avoid or 
significantly reduce both foreign and U.S. taxation by carefully working to fall within 
mismatches between the tax laws of the U.S. and one or more other countries to arbitrage 
their tax systems. 
Both Fiscally Transparent and Non-Fiscally Transparent Entities. Sometimes, carefully 
crafted structures involve a special arrangement between a foreign entity (whether a DRE 
subsidiary or any non-fiscally transparent foreign entity) and the foreign tax authorities 
that allows these companies to pay tax at zero or discounted rates not allowable absent 
such agreement. In these cases, since the home county is not taxing the foreign entity on a 
true resident basis, no reduction in or elimination of U.S withholding taxes or other tax 
treaty benefits (e.g. the application of business profits provisions and reduction in or 
elimination of the §884 branch profits tax) should be permitted. 
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The remainder of this Appendix F provides specific recommendations on regulation 
amendments or guidance that could be provided in a revenue ruling that would disallow 
these inappropriate treaty benefits. 
Fiscally Transparent Entities—Treaty Benefits Other than Reduction or 
Elimination of Withholding Taxes 
With respect to non-withholding tax treaty benefits claimed where CFC and DRE 
subsidiary structures are involved, the terms of tax treaties and current law allow the IRS 
to disallow these benefits. The IRS may directly enforce these rules against such abusive 
arrangements. 
For the CFC, the fact that its tax filings made to its home country will exclude all income, 
deductions, credits, etc. recorded within its DRE subsidiaries means that it cannot be a 
resident for purposes of the tax treaty under the last sentence of Article 4, paragraph 1. 
This sentence in the February 17, 2017, version of the U.S. Model Income Tax 
Convention reads: 
… This term does not include any person whose tax is determined in that 
Contracting State on a fixed-fee, “forfait” or similar basis, or who is liable to tax 
in respect only of income from sources in that Contracting State or of profits 
attributable to a permanent establishment in that Contracting State. [Emphasis 
added.] 
For the DRE subsidiaries, as indicated earlier, a DRE subsidiary is not recognized as an 
“entity” for U.S. tax purposes. As such, the IRS may simply refuse to grant any relevant 
tax treaty benefits under the treaty between the U.S. and the country of establishment of 
the DRE subsidiary on the basis that the DRE subsidiary cannot be a “person” for 
purposes of that treaty under Article 3, and therefore not a treaty “resident” under Article 
4. 
Needed: Regulatory and/or ruling guidance concerning the non-applicability 
of tax treaty benefits in the above circumstances. 
Fiscally Transparent Entities—Treaty Benefits for Withholding Taxes 
With respect to reduction in or elimination of withholding taxes, Reg §1.894-1(d) 
provides relevant rules.13 
A critical first rule relevant to these abusive arrangements is that the regulation provides 
for DRE subsidiaries at paragraph (d)(3)(i) an expansive definition of “entity”. As such, 
this definition overrides the lack of any “entity” (as explained in the section immediately 
above) that otherwise occurs under the domestic U.S. rules. 
Needed: A tax abuse rule that will override this paragraph (d)(3)(i) 
definition. 
A critical second rule is the regulation’s concept of “derived by a resident” found in 
paragraph (d)(1). T.D. 8889 (65 F.R. 40993-41000, 2000) consciously included this 																																																								
13 Note that Reg §1.894-1(d) by its terms only applies to certain withholding taxes. These 
rules have no applicability to the non-withholding tax treaty benefits discussed 
immediately above. 
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concept as the mechanism to determine qualification for withholding tax treaty benefits. 
In brief, T.D. 8889 included the following explanation: 
Commentators suggested that the term subject to tax in the proposed and 
temporary regulations was ambiguous and could be misinterpreted. 
Commentators suggested that the term subject to tax could be interpreted as 
requiring that an actual tax be paid rather than requiring an exercise of taxing 
jurisdiction by the applicable treaty jurisdiction, whether or not there is an actual 
tax paid. Commentators suggested that such an interpretation would lead to 
anomalous results, for example, in cases when the applicable treaty jurisdiction 
provides an exemption from income for U.S. source dividends under its tax laws. 
The IRS and Treasury agree that the term subject to tax could cause unintentional 
confusion and that a more direct and simpler way of ensuring that an item of 
income is subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the residence country is to 
determine if the item of income is derived by a resident of a treaty jurisdiction. 
The concept of derived by a resident is a more useful surrogate for the concept of 
subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the residence state, the necessary prerequisite 
for the grant of treaty benefits on an item of income. 
Because of this expansive “derived by a resident” rule that is totally divorced from any 
actual or potential tax liability or inclusion in taxable income, special rulings, 
administrative practices, and other artificial means have expanded to meet the needs of 
MNCs intent on creating complex structures that shift profits and/or erode the U.S. tax 
base, making full use of the U.S. treaty network in the process. The light shed on this 
from the LuxLeaks disclosures14 and other sources has been extensive. 
Needed: A tax abuse rule that will override this “derived by a resident” test 
and replace it with a “subject to tax” test. 
In considering the above, the Treasury and IRS should keep in mind that the MNCs that 
create these CFC and DRE subsidiary structures have voluntarily-made check-the-box 
elections. The applicable taxpayer (i.e., the CFC) was not coerced into making these 
elections for its subsidiaries. Rather, these elections are made only after careful group-
wide study of how to maximize profit-shifting and base erosion benefits. This being the 
case, it is more than reasonable that such taxpayers must live with the consequences of 
their actions. The above recommendations are appropriate and in no way excessive. 
Abuse Not Involving Fiscally Transparent Entities 
Many foreign MNCs abuse the U.S. treaty network on interest and royalty flows. One of 
the clearest examples is described in the Majority Staff Report titled “Impact of the U.S. 
Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and Jobs” issued on July 30, 2015, by the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Committee of Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs) under the Chairmanship of Rob Portman. The example involves 
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., a Canadian-based pharmaceutical MNC that 
resulted from a 2010 inversion. 																																																								
14 Available at: https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/explore-documents-
luxembourg-leaks-database 
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The following is from pages 25-30 of this 2015 Majority Staff Report: 
In connection with the Bausch & Lomb acquisition, Valeant pushed down $2.4 
billion of the acquisition debt from its foreign affiliates to a Delaware subsidiary 
(VPI-Delaware), thereby creating a stream of deductible interest payments that 
have significantly reduced Bausch & Lomb’s U.S. tax base. Specifically, Valeant-
Canada issued an aggregate $7.3 billion in debt financing from third-party banks. 
Valeant-Canada then made an interest-free loan of $3.1 billion to a Luxembourg 
subsidiary, Biovail International S.a.r.l., which in turn made an interest-bearing 
loan (at 6%) of $2.4 billion to VPI-Delaware. 
The result of this intercompany lending is evident in the rise in Valeant- U.S.’s 
tax-deductible, outbound related-party interest payments. In the two years 
preceding the Bausch & Lomb acquisition, Valeant’s U.S. group made an average 
of $219,000 per quarter in related-party interest payments. In the first full year 
following the acquisition, those payments swelled to $59.9 million per quarter—a 
273-fold increase. To date, Valeant’s U.S. group has made $320.2 million in 
interest payments on the Bausch & Lomb acquisition debt to Biovail International 
S.a.r.l. and projects another $375 million in interest payments through the first 
quarter of 2017; those payments will continue through the life of the loan. The 
interest payments are fully deductible in the U.S. and subject to no U.S. federal 
withholding taxes. Only a portion of the interest income received by Valeant in 
Luxembourg is taxable—at single-digit tax rates. 
 [Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.] 
As if this insult to the U.S. taxation system were not enough, the following is from page 
30 of the 2015 Majority Staff Report: 
Valeant structured the Salix acquisition debt in a manner that will significantly 
reduce Valeant’s U.S. tax base. Valeant-Canada raised $15.2 billion in debt 
financing from third parties to support the Salix acquisition. Valeant then made an 
interest-free loan of $16.5 billion to VFL (Luxembourg). VFL, in turn, made six 
intercompany loans totaling $16.5 billion to VPI Delaware at an average interest 
rate of approximately 6.2%. Valeant projects that, from the first quarter of 2015 
through the first quarter of 2017, it will make $1.67 billion in interest payments 
on the Salix debt to VFL; those payments are scheduled to continue until the 
maturity date of each loan (ranging from 2021 to 2025). To date, Valeant’s 
interest payments on the Salix acquisition debt have been fully deductible in the 
U.S. and subject to no U.S. federal withholding taxes. Only a portion of the 
interest income received by Valeant in Luxembourg is taxable—at single-digit tax 
rates. [Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.] 
This sort of artificial arrangement (very low effective tax rate in Luxembourg due to 
deemed interest deductions on an interest-free loan), and most likely a special ruling from 
the Luxembourg tax authorities, is abusive. The group’s international planning likely 
results in a double deduction of interest and little or no effective taxation ever of the 
interest income in either Luxembourg or in Valeant’s home country of Canada. 
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Needed: Regulatory and/or ruling guidance to help taxpayers and the IRS 
identify abusive situations where tax treaty coverage should no longer be 
appropriate given that the relevant income is not being taxed in the treaty 
country of residence in the same manner as a normal resident would be 
taxed.15 
As an indication of the basis for such broad guidance, the following is from T.D. 8999 
(67 F.R. 40157-40162, 2002). The initial sentence refers to abuses involving domestic 
reverse hybrids. 
… The overall effect of these transactions, if respected, would be (1) a deduction 
under U.S. law for the “outbound” payment of an item of income, (2) the 
reduction or elimination of U.S. withholding tax on that item of income under an 
applicable treaty, and (3) the imposition of little or no tax by the treaty partner on 
the item of income. This result is inconsistent with the expectation of the United 
States and its treaty partners that treaties should be used to reduce or eliminate 
double taxation of income. The legislative history of section 894(c) supports this 
analysis. Congress specifically expressed its concern about the use of income tax 
treaties to manipulate the inconsistencies between U.S. and foreign tax laws to 
obtain similar benefits. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No 220, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 573 
(1997); Joint Committee on Taxation, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., General 
Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997 (JCS-23-97), at 249 (December 
17, 1997). The approach adopted by these regulations also is consistent with the 
U.S. view that contracting states to an income tax treaty may adopt provisions in 
their domestic laws to prevent inappropriate use of the treaty. … 
As further encouragement of the critical need for additional regulatory and/or ruling 
guidance in this general area, it may be noted that Reg §1.894-1(d) was promulgated soon 
after the issuance of the new check-the-box entity classification rules and without 
anticipating how MNCs would aggressively utilize them to shift profits outside the U.S. 
and erode the U.S. tax base.  																																																								15	Interestingly,	while	guidance	is	needed	to	cover	the	entire	U.S.	treaty	network,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	U.S.-Luxembourg	treaty	states	in	Article	24	(Limitation	on	Benefits):	10.	Notwithstanding	the	other	provisions	of	this	Article,	Luxembourg	holding	companies,	within	the	meaning	of	the	Act	(loi)	of	July	31,	1929	and	the	Decree	(arrete	grand-ducal)	of	December	17,	1938,	or	any	subsequent	revision	thereof,	or	such	other	companies	that	enjoy	a	similar	special	fiscal	
treatment	by	virtue	of	the	laws	of	Luxembourg,	are	not	residents.	[Emphasis	added.]	Considering	the	low	level	of	taxation	within	Luxembourg	due	to	the	interest	free	loan	with	a	deemed	interest	deduction,	this	provides	a	strong	treaty-based	position	to	deny	coverage	of	this	tax	treaty	for	abusive	transactions.	Consideration	should	be	given	to	expanding	rulings	and	other	Treasury	and	IRS	materials	to	provide	guidance	that	takes	actual	tax	treaty	provisions	such	as	this	into	account.	
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T.D. 8889 and T.D. 8999 expanded Reg §1.894-1 in 2000 and 2002, focusing principally 
on structures that would involve income flows to “real” foreign persons. Further, they 
were expressly limited to treaty benefits applicable to withholding taxes and domestic 
reverse hybrids. T.D. 8889 commented: 
These regulations apply with respect to all U.S. income tax treaties regardless of 
whether such treaties contain partnership provisions, unless the competent 
authorities agree otherwise. As with the proposed and temporary regulations, the 
final regulations address only the treatment of U.S. source income that is not 
effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business. The IRS and 
Treasury may issue additional regulations addressing the availability of other tax 
treaty benefits, such as the application of business profits provisions, with respect 
to the income of fiscally transparent entities, particularly where a conflict in entity 
classification exists. [Emphasis added.] 
After these regulations were issued, abusive profit shifting and base erosion by U.S. 
MNCs involving foreign hybrid entities grew quickly, if not exponentially, especially 
after the 2004 Jobs Act repatriation incentive. Despite this quick growth, detailed study 
and knowledge only started to become public in 2010 when the Staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation issued its report titled “Present Law and Background Related to 
Possible Income Shifting and Transfer Pricing” (JCX-37-10), dated July 20, 2010, for a 
Ways and Means Committee public hearing. This public hearing and the JCT’s report, 
along with other hearings and investigative reporting in subsequent years (Google, 
Microsoft, Apple, Caterpillar, etc.), laid clear the aggressive and artificial nature of many 
of the structures that our MNCs eagerly adopted. 
In short, it’s time for regulatory and ruling guidance that eliminates inappropriate treaty 
benefits both within the framework of Code §894(c) and broader. 
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Effects of the New Sourcing Rule: ECI and Profit Shifting
by David L. Koontz and Jeffery M. Kadet
For the first time in eons, Congress has seen fit 
to change a basic rule for the sourcing of income. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97) minced 
few words in its addition of a single sentence to 
section 863(b) that applies to sales or exchanges of 
inventory property (1) produced in whole or in 
part by the taxpayer in one country, and (2) sold or 
exchanged in another country. The United States 
can either be the country where the inventory 
property is produced or the country where it is 
sold.
The new sentence reads:
Gains, profits, and income from the sale or 
exchange of inventory property described 
in paragraph (2) shall be allocated and 
apportioned between sources within and 
without the United States solely on the basis 
of the production activities with respect to the 
property. [Emphasis added.]
With this change, income from the sale of 
inventory produced by a taxpayer will no longer 
be sourced at the location where any sales 
activities take place. Rather, the location, or 
locations, of production activities will be the sole 
determining factor. This change is effective for tax 
years beginning after December 31, 2017.
I. Why Was the Rule Changed?
Under the U.S. tax system, sourcing of income 
within or outside the United States has been, and 
will remain, important for two principal reasons. 
First, income source is the basis for the vitally 
important foreign tax credit limitation formula, 
which specifies the maximum foreign income 
taxes that may be used by a U.S. taxpayer to offset 
U.S. income tax. Second, a non-U.S. taxpayer will 
be subject to tax in the United States only on 
income that is either U.S. source or is effectively 
connected with the conduct of a trade or business 
within the United States. The determination of 
effectively connected income is very much 
dependent on sourcing rules.
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Asia as a tax partner in a major accounting firm. 
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In this article, Koontz and Kadet discuss the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s new sourcing rule for 
sales of manufactured inventory property, which 
states that gross income from the sale or 
exchange of property produced by the taxpayer 
will be sourced at the place of manufacture. That 
is a departure from the old rule, which assigned 
gross income partially to the place of sale (the old 
title passage rule) and partially to the place of 
manufacture. They explain that in addition to 
closing a long-standing foreign tax credit 
loophole, this change gives foreign-based entities 
selling manufactured products in the United 
States a clear roadmap for avoiding U.S. tax on 
those sales. Also, it profoundly affects the many 
multinational profit-shifting structures that 
involve groups with manufacturing 
management, decision-making, and related 
functions within the United States, but which 
often use contract manufacturers outside the 
United States. When effectively connected 
income taxation applies, more gross income will 
be sourced within the United States and be 
taxable ECI. The authors argue that Treasury and 
the IRS should modernize reg. section 1.863-3 
and related rules to reflect not only this TCJA 
change, but also the business models using 
contract manufacturers that did not exist when 
the current regulations were issued.
Copyright 2018 David L. Koontz and 
Jeffery M. Kadet. 
All rights reserved.
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Despite those two principal reasons for the 
importance of sourcing rules, the committee 
reports explaining this change in law do not focus 
on how the change could affect either the FTC or 
the taxation of non-U.S. taxpayers. Rather, the 
House committee report merely says:
The Committee acknowledges that 
current administrative guidance, which 
sources sales income, in part, based on the 
place of destination rather than the place 
of production, may be appropriate in the 
context of our current tax system. 
However, the Committee believes this 
approach is not appropriate under a 
participation exemption system with 
lower tax rates. Rather than providing 
targeted relief to particular kinds of 
income, the Committee is instead 
reducing tax rates for all taxpayers, while 
also modernizing the U.S. system for 
taxing cross-border income. Therefore, the 
Committee believes changing present law 
in this area will more accurately measure 
foreign-source taxable income as part of 
providing a flatter, fairer, and simpler tax 
system.1
The committee is saying that the sourcing 
change is consistent with two of the TCJA’s 
fundamental changes: (1) the significant 
reduction of corporate rates, and (2) the 
participation exemption. But the committee 
leaves it to the reader to speculate why that might 
be so.
While the above reflects Congress’s 
explanation of good tax policy, we suspect that the 
amendment most likely reflects a desire to 
eliminate a long-standing loophole for artificially 
increasing a U.S. taxpayer’s ability to use foreign 
taxes to offset U.S. taxes. In brief, under the old 
rule and the long-standing regulations 
interpreting it, it was often possible for a U.S. 
taxpayer that is manufacturing products within 
the United States and selling them overseas to 
treat half of the gross profit as foreign source, 
thereby artificially increasing the available FTC 
limitation and using otherwise excess FTCs to 
reduce current U.S. tax payable. That result was 
allowed even if the taxpayer had no overseas 
branch or other foreign activities that contributed 
to the sale. By eliminating sales activities as a 
factor and sourcing income at the place of 
production, that loophole has been closed.2
II. Effect on Profit-Shifting Structures
A. ECI Taxation and Profit-Shifting Structures
The authors have written several articles 
focused on the application of ECI taxation to 
specific profit-shifting structures involving 
worldwide businesses that are centrally managed 
and conducted from the United States.3 Those 
structures typically exhibit three economic and 
operational factors:
1. value drivers in the United States;
2. control and decision-making in United 
States; and
3. lack of a foreign group member CEO 
and management outside the United 
States that are capable of operating an 
independent stand-alone business.
When applicable, ECI taxation would impose 
U.S. corporation tax at normal corporate rates4 on 
some portion of the shifted profits that 
multinational groups have recorded within their 
foreign group members established in zero- or 
low-taxed foreign jurisdictions (low-taxed foreign 
members). Note that this imposition of U.S. 
corporate tax on ECI is a direct tax on the low-
taxed foreign member. This contrasts with the 
indirect taxation that arises under the subpart F 
controlled foreign corporation rules or through 
1
H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, at 384.
2
For further discussion of this rule change, see Jasper L. Cummings, 
Jr., “Selective Tax Act Analysis: Subpart F and Foreign Tax Credits,” Tax 
Notes, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 653.
3
Jeffery M. Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting: The Approach 
Everyone Forgets,” Tax Notes, July 13, 2015, p. 193; Thomas J. Kelley, 
David L. Koontz, and Kadet, “Profit Shifting: Effectively Connected 
Income and Financial Statement Risks,” 221 J. Acct. 48 (Feb. 2016); Kadet 
and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected Partnership 
Status,” Tax Notes, Apr. 18, 2016, p. 335; Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-
Shifting Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 1,” Tax 
Notes, June 27, 2016, p. 1831; and Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting 
Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 2,” Tax Notes, 
July 4, 2016, p. 85.
4
The rates are currently 21 percent (up to 35 percent before the 
TCJA), plus the 30 percent section 884 branch profits tax when not 
reduced or eliminated under an applicable tax treaty.
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transfer pricing adjustments when the taxpayer is 
a U.S. person.
A common feature of many profit-shifting 
structures is that a low-taxed foreign member 
sources its inventory directly from one or more 
contract manufacturers, whether related or 
unrelated, and sells it to customers around the 
world. As explained below, the low-taxed foreign 
member, despite the lack of its own 
manufacturing facilities, is economically the 
manufacturer, with this manufacturer status 
normally reflected contractually through the 
following mechanisms:
i. Holding intellectual property rights. The 
low-taxed foreign member will be a 
licensee or a participant in, respectively, a 
license or cost-sharing agreement that 
defines the IP rights held.
ii. Agreements with contract manufacturers. 
These agreements are typically more in 
the nature of service agreements. The 
party holding the intangibles (that is, the 
IP that allows production and 
trademarking of a specific product) directs 
the other party, which has the necessary 
plant, equipment, and personnel, to use 
those intangibles to produce the specified 
products. In the absence of such an 
agreement, the contract manufacturer 
would not be allowed to produce the 
product.5
iii. Intercompany agreements. Under 
intercompany agreements, other group 
members (typically located primarily 
within the United States) perform 
production activities for the low-taxed 
foreign member. Usually structured as 
service agreements, the service provider 
group member contractually purports to 
act as an independent contractor and not 
as a partner, agent, or in a joint venture 
with the low-taxed foreign member. 
Despite this contractual approach, the 
service provider often performs crucial 
business functions and makes business 
decisions for the low-taxed foreign 
member. These are functions and 
decision-making that the low-taxed 
foreign member typically has neither the 
capacity nor the personnel to either 
conduct itself or competently direct 
service providers to perform.
In short, under these arrangements, the low-
taxed foreign member is not simply purchasing a 
product for resale. Rather, directly or indirectly, it 
conducts manufacturing and assumes most of the 
same production and commercial risks that any 
manufacturer assumes, and is, in fact, the 
manufacturer. Because these low-taxed foreign 
members are both producing and selling, section 
863(b) is relevant when two jurisdictions are 
involved and either the production or selling 
activities occur within the United States.
Profit-shifting structures often involve a low-
taxed foreign member (including its disregarded 
entity subsidiaries6) that is taxed either nowhere 
or at low effective tax rates in the countries where 
it conducts operations. These structures also 
conveniently sidestep the CFC rules by avoiding 
purchases from and sales to related group 
members.7 Thus, before the effective date of the 
TCJA, and ignoring any potential ECI taxation, no 
U.S. tax would have been paid currently on the 
low-taxed foreign member’s profits.8
5
As an example of a contract manufacturing arrangement, see 
Facebook’s 2017 Form 10-K at 24. The Form 10-K sets out clearly the 
group’s use of third parties to manufacture its Oculus products, as well 
as the various production and other commercial risks the group faces.
6
Reg. section 301.7701-2(c)(2). Unless otherwise noted, any reference 
in this article to the low-taxed foreign member includes the assets, 
personnel, and activities of any disregarded entity subsidiaries that are 
treated as divisions or branches for U.S. tax purposes.
7
More than just U.S.-based multinational groups are involved in 
profit-shifting structures. When, for example, an inverted multinational 
based in Ireland uses a low-taxed foreign member that records sales of 
inventory property as part of a profit-shifting structure, that low-taxed 
foreign member will often be owned directly or indirectly by the Irish 
parent. In that case, no income will be created under either sections 951 
or 951A, meaning that the subpart F and GILTI rules will be irrelevant. 
For an example of planning using non-CFCs by an inverted group, see 
the discussion of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc.’s 
acquisitions and subsequent internal operations concerning Medicis 
Pharmaceutical Corp., Bausch & Lomb Holding Inc., and Salix 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. from pages 19ff of the majority staff report 
prepared for hearings before the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
“Impact of the U.S. Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and 
Jobs” (July 30, 2015).
8
Of course, if a dividend were paid to a U.S. shareholder before the 
effective date of the TCJA, U.S. tax would be paid.
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After the TCJA’s effective date (and again 
ignoring any potential ECI taxation), the global 
intangible low-taxed income9 provisions could 
result in current U.S. tax at an effective rate of 
roughly half the domestic 21 percent corporate tax 
rate. That lower effective tax rate will cause many, 
if not most, multinationals to continue existing 
profit-shifting structures and will likely 
encourage many new ones. Even the 
Congressional Budget Office in its April 2018 
Budget and Economic Outlook concluded that the 
TCJA will have only a minor effect on the 
approximate $300 billion of profits it estimates are 
shifted each year out of the U.S. tax base. The CBO 
estimates that the TCJA will reduce this $300 
billion by only $65 billion, with a third of that 
reduction (say $20 billion to $25 billion) relating to 
IP transfers into zero- and low-taxed countries. 
These IP transfers are integral to the profit shifting 
that is a focus of this article. (Note that about half 
of this $65 billion estimated reduction arises from 
TCJA provisions focused on profit shifting that 
involves debt and its related interest charges.10)
Multinationals that have created profit-
shifting structures include:
1. U.S. multinationals;
2. former U.S. multinationals that have 
inverted;
3. former U.S. multinationals acquired by 
private equity and other investment funds 
through foreign acquisition vehicles; and
4. former U.S. multinationals acquired by 
foreign multinationals that leave U.S. 
management intact.
The low-taxed foreign members of 
multinationals in the first category will almost 
always be CFCs and subject to the CFC rules as 
well as the new GILTI rules. However, for the 
other three categories, the low-taxed foreign 
members will normally be owned by foreign 
group members so that there is no coverage by the 
CFC and GILTI rules.11 Because of this, for the 
other three categories, the new GILTI rules will 
not at all discourage these profit-shifting 
structures in the future. Further, these structures 
will seldom, if ever, involve any outbound 
related-party payments from U.S. group 
members, meaning that the new base erosion 
minimum tax12 will have no effect.
In summary, aside from potential ECI 
taxation, most multinationals will have no reason 
to either discontinue existing profit-shifting 
structures or refrain from initiating new ones.
B. Basis for ECI Taxation
As noted above, a low-taxed foreign member 
within a profit-shifting structure may hold IP 
rights allowing it to manufacture products or to 
rely on others, such as contract manufacturers, to 
do so. Often, the low-taxed foreign member has 
neither the physical assets (for example, plants 
and equipment) nor knowledgeable personnel 
that would make it capable of either 
manufacturing the products on its own or 
directing a contract manufacturer to produce 
them. So without either physical assets or 
personnel, how does such a low-taxed foreign 
member operate? How does it acquire the 
products that it will sell to its distributors and 
customers around the world?
9
Detailed discussion of GILTI is beyond the scope of this article. See 
sections 951A and 250.
10
See the CBO’s April 2018 Budget and Economic Outlook, at 124-127. 
This report makes clear the CBO’s doubt that there will be any significant 
reduction of profit shifting. From page 125:
CBO estimates that the reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate, 
combined with the new [GILTI] rules governing the treatment of income 
from high-return investments (much of which is derived from IP), will 
reduce corporations’ incentives to shift profits by transferring IP outside 
the United States. However, that effect is expected to be modest. IP is 
especially easy to relocate, so MNCs are typically able to locate it in 
whichever affiliates face the lowest tax rate on the income that it 
generates. Because tax havens outside the United States will continue to have 
relatively low tax rates, CBO projects that most IP currently located will remain 
there. For newly created or future IP, the changes resulting from the tax act and 
the fixed costs of transferring IP to foreign affiliates will probably deter some 
small amount of profit shifting. [Emphasis added.]
11
For the other three categories, there will be situations where a low-
taxed foreign member is partially owned by one or more U.S. group 
members. Even where the U.S. ownership is less than 50 percent, the 
TCJA’s repeal of section 958(b)(4) may have the effect of causing those 
group members to be CFCs. Despite such a CFC classification, the 
directly foreign-owned portion should remain protected from any 
subpart F or GILTI taxation.
12
See section 59A and Kadet and Koontz, “Internet Platform 
Companies and Base Erosion — Issue and Solution,” Tax Notes, Dec. 4, 
2017, p. 1435.
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Over the past few decades, technological and 
other digital developments13 have allowed many 
multinational groups with worldwide businesses 
centrally managed from the United States to 
create supply chains that include important 
production and sales functions conducted in 
multiple countries. In some cases, although 
physical manufacturing may be conducted in 
plants and facilities around the world (with those 
plants and facilities often being owned and 
operated by unrelated contract manufacturers), 
almost by necessity, many if not all significant 
production activities (short of the physical 
production) are carried out by U.S.-based 
personnel. In those situations, U.S.-based 
personnel are responsible for and actually 
conduct production activities for the group’s 
worldwide operations — that is, they plan, 
manage, and carry out production activities for all 
group members that hold IP exploitation rights 
for various geographic regions. For example, 
personnel based within the United States make 
business decisions and conduct production 
activities that directly allow (1) one or more U.S. 
group members to manufacture or have 
manufactured the products that they sell to U.S. 
customers, and (2) one or more low-taxed foreign 
members to manufacture or have manufactured 
the products that they sell to customers in non-
U.S. geographic territories.
Most importantly, this means that the 
activities of these personnel directly benefit, and 
are carried out for and on behalf of, multiple 
group members, thereby representing the joint 
production of products by these multiple group 
members. Also, in many cases the products being 
physically produced by contract manufacturers 
will not be identified as being produced for, or 
owned by, any specific group member until either 
late in the production process or until they’ve 
been packed for shipment to a customer.
What are these joint production activities and 
functions that are short of actual physical 
production?14 They include, for example:
1. oversight and direction of production 
activities;
2. material selection, vendor selection, 
control of raw materials, work-in-process, 
or finished goods;
3. management of manufacturing costs or 
capacities;
4. control of manufacturing-related 
logistics; and
5. quality control.
With two or more group members involved in 
joint production, the IRC’s partnership rules, 
regulations, and a litany of case law come into 
play. In short, joint production activities are more 
than enough to create a partnership for U.S. tax 
purposes. This finding of a partnership will be 
even more obvious when there is a central 
management function (including product sales 
management) that presents the group’s business 
to customers, distributors, and others as one 
seamless worldwide business and that makes 
innumerable business decisions affecting that 
business (for example, determining production 
quantities, terms for transactions with third 
parties, and product pricing).
Interested readers may refer to our previously 
cited article for an explanation of how a profit-
shifting structure may create a partnership for 
U.S. tax purposes.15 In short, that article notes that 
many profit-shifting structures involve one 
worldwide, centrally managed and conducted 
business, the operations and transactions of 
which have been separated into multiple group 
members with each member conducting defined 
portions of that business. The article explains how 
in many cases the group members are partners in 
an unacknowledged partnership for U.S. tax 
13
For considerable discussion of these developments and their effects 
on cross-border commerce, see OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising From 
Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS,” in 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, 
Paris). See also Section II of Kadet, “BEPS: A Primer on Where It Came 
From and Where It’s Going,” Tax Notes, Feb. 15, 2016, p. 793.
14
See reg. section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), which is the source for this 
listing. While in some cases there will be overlap with research and 
development work, these production activities and functions are in fact 
separate from R&D. Thus, special rules governing R&D such as the cost-
sharing agreement regulations and the entity classification rules do not 
apply. See reg. sections 1.482-7(j)(2)(iii) and 301.7701-1(c).
15
See Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected 
Partnership Status,” supra note 3.
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purposes. Suffice it to say that the existence of a 
partnership, while not a necessity, simply makes 
the application by the IRS of ECI taxation more 
certain and considerably easier to implement.16
Once there is a partnership with the relevant 
U.S. and foreign group members as partners, all 
joint activities and related revenue and expenses 
are considered to be conducted, earned, and 
incurred within the partnership and no longer 
conducted, earned, and incurred by any of the 
partners.17 This means that the relevant low-taxed 
foreign member or members are partners in a 
partnership that is conducting a trade or business 
within the United States that is partially or wholly 
producing inventory property in the United 
States for sale outside the United States.18 Under 
these circumstances, low-taxed foreign member 
partners will be treated as engaging in a trade or 
business within the United States19 and will have 
some amount of ECI, for which they must file 
Form 1120-F (U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign 
Corporation) and pay applicable U.S. corporate 
income tax. The partnership must apply section 
1446 withholding tax.
It will often be the case that U.S. group 
members, acting independently on a regular and 
continuing basis, make business decisions and 
negotiate and conclude important terms of 
contracts on behalf of their low-taxed foreign 
members. These independent actions cover 
matters such as component and raw material 
sourcing, contract manufacturing agreements, 
production planning, overseeing the 
manufacturing process, and quality control. Thus, 
even if no partnership exists for tax purposes, the 
facts may establish that U.S. group members are 
de facto agents acting on behalf of their low-taxed 
foreign members, thereby creating a trade or 
business within the United States with some 
amount of ECI. De facto agency status is sufficient 
to meet the “trade or business in the United 
States” test for application of the ECI rules.
C. Before TCJA
Section 863(b) and relevant regulations in 
effect before the TCJA provide for sourcing of 
applicable gross income from production and 
sales by attributing one portion to production 
activity and the remainder to sales activity. While 
not the only method set out in the regulations,20 a 
commonly used approach is the 50/50 method, 
under which gross income is apportioned one-
half to production activity and one-half to sales 
activity. While the production activity portion is 
sourced based on the location of production 
assets,21 the sales activity portion is governed by 
the long-standing sourcing rule that looks to the 
country in which the sale occurs — the title 
passage rule.22 Under those rules, even if a 
product was wholly produced within the United 
States and no actual sales activities were 
performed by the taxpayer outside the United 
States, one-half of the gross income was treated as 
foreign source as long as the sale was foreign 
source under the title passage rule. This is the 
costly loophole that the TCJA section 863(b) 
amendment closes.
Consider a profit-shifting structure in which a 
low-taxed foreign member and one or more other 
group members are partners in a partnership that 
manufactures and sells inventory property. Most 
likely the structure was created, of course, with 
the group’s management and its advisers either 
ignoring or overlooking the very real possibility 
that their jointly conducted business activities 
have created a partnership for U.S. tax purposes. 
(Even if no partnership was found to exist for tax 
purposes, there would likely be a de facto agency 
relationship between the low-taxed foreign 
member and one or more U.S. group members 
16
The authors are unaware of any IRS attempt to assert an 
unintended partnership in a profit-shifting structure. However, the 
actual facts regarding how members of some groups operate joint 
businesses might be so strong that those groups may, after a careful 
review, conclude that a partnership exists for tax purposes and act 
accordingly.
17
See LTR 201305006.
18
Note that under the code, regulations, and case law, there will still 
be a partnership with production occurring within the United States 
even when the partnership activities are limited to joint production with 
each partner taking its share of production as a distribution in kind for 
sale by that partner. Thus, although many centrally managed groups 
conducting joint production also direct and conduct sales activities 
centrally, the performance of these centrally directed sales activities are 
not necessary for the results described in this article.
19
See section 875(1). Activities conducted within the United States 
will usually be more than sufficient to cause a permanent establishment 
when a tax treaty applies.
20
See reg. section 1.863-3(b) and (g)(2).
21
See reg. section 1.863-3(c)(1) and (g)(2).
22
See reg. sections 1.863-3(c)(2), (g)(2), and 1.861-7(c).
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acting on its behalf.) Except as noted in the below 
discussion, this partnership conducts all 
production activities within the United States and 
sells the inventory property both within and 
outside the United States. Assume also that 
physical production of the inventory property is 
performed by an unrelated contract manufacturer 
outside the United States.
Under the pre-TCJA sourcing rules, and using 
the 50/50 method, the gross income from foreign 
sales would result in 50 percent of the gross profit 
being U.S. source and 50 percent being foreign 
source.23 This has the following consequences for 
the low-taxed foreign member partner:
1. Because the U.S.-source income is ECI at 
the partnership level,24 the portion of ECI 
allocable under section 704 to the low-
taxed foreign member partner is subject to 
both section 1446 withholding and normal 
corporate taxation at a rate of up to 35 
percent.25 The 30 percent section 884 
branch profits tax would also apply if not 
reduced or eliminated under an applicable 
tax treaty.
2. When the low-taxed foreign member 
partner is a CFC, the manufacturing 
branch rule26 will likely apply to cause 
some portion of the partnership’s foreign-
source income allocable to that partner to 
be currently taxable under subpart F to the 
U.S. shareholder.27
D. After TCJA
Once the TCJA is effective, changes that will 
affect the above-described profit-shifting 
structure include:
1. sourcing of income from covered 
inventory property transactions solely to 
the location or locations of production 
(section 863(b) amendment);
2. taxation of GILTI; and
3. reduction of the corporate tax rate to a 
flat 21 percent rate from its previous rates 
of up to 35 percent.
These changes result in the following 
consequences for the low-taxed foreign member 
partner:
1. With a finding that all the partnership’s 
production activities are conducted within 
the United States (the related contract 
manufacturer’s assets and activities 
outside the United States are ignored for 
this purpose because they are not assets of 
the partnership, but rather assets of the 
contract manufacturer), the full gross 
income from product sales will be U.S.-
source income28 and ECI at the partnership 
level. As with the pre-TCJA situation 
described above, the portion of ECI 
allocable under section 704 to the low-
taxed foreign member partner will be 
subject to section 1446 withholding; 
23
Note that the assets of the contract manufacturer outside the 
United States do not affect the source of income from production 
activities. Thus, under these assumed facts, all 50 percent of the gross 
profits from production activities are U.S. source.
24
See section 864(c)(3).
25
See discussion in prior articles listed in supra note 3, covering both 
the potential loss of deductions and credits under section 882(c)(2) and 
open statute of limitations under section 6501(c)(3) when the low-taxed 
foreign member has not filed a tax return for a prior year.
26
See reg. section 1.954-3(b)(1)(ii).
27
In brief, with the manufacturing branch being in the United States, 
the manufacturing branch rule (reg. section 1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(b)) is 
applied comparing the effective tax rate on the relevant foreign-source 
sales income with 30 percent. This 30 percent is the lower of 90 percent 
of, or 5 percentage points less than, the 35 percent U.S. tax rate. With the 
profit-shifting structure minimizing the imposition of foreign taxes to 
very low rates, the manufacturing branch rule should apply to relevant 
foreign sales that are otherwise caught by the section 954(d)(1) definition 
of foreign base company sales income (FBCSI). Note also that not all 
foreign-source income will be FBCSI. For example, if the partnership or 
the low-taxed foreign member partner has a sales office in Singapore, 
inventory property sold for use, consumption, or disposition within 
Singapore would not be caught by the section 954(d)(1) FBCSI definition. 
However, sales into nearby Malaysia where there is no sales office would 
be caught.
28
The facts in this example assume that 100 percent of production 
activities occur within the United States. When the partnership conducts 
production activities and holds production assets outside the United 
States, some portion would be foreign source and avoid ECI taxation.
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normal corporate taxation, though now at 
the 21 percent flat rate; and the 30 
percent section 884 branch profits tax if 
applicable.
2. Because all gross income in this example 
is caught by the new section 863(b) 
sourcing rule and is therefore ECI, none of 
that income will be subject to the new 
GILTI rules29 when they would otherwise 
apply to a U.S. shareholder because the 
low-taxed foreign member is a CFC. The 
GILTI rules (as well as the subpart F rules), 
of course, recognize that when a CFC is 
taxable on ECI, there is no need to include 
that already taxed income in the income of 
any U.S. shareholder.
The above consequences assume that 100 
percent of the production activities occurred in 
the United States. Say instead that 25 percent of 
the partnership’s production assets are located 
outside the United States, thereby causing 25 
percent of the gross income from product sales to 
be foreign source.30 That would cause that portion 
of gross income to escape ECI taxation.
Assuming the low-taxed foreign member is a 
CFC, either the above-mentioned subpart F 
manufacturing branch rule or the GILTI rules 
would apply to its U.S. shareholders regarding 
the 25 percent of gross income that is foreign 
source. In short, the manufacturing branch rule 
could conceivably apply, with its application 
depending on the tax rate in the country where 
the partial manufacturing takes place and the 
effective tax rate paid on that income. When the 
manufacturing branch rule doesn’t apply, the 
income would be included in the U.S. 
shareholder’s GILTI computation. As for the 
applicable U.S. tax rate, when subpart F applies, it 
would be the flat 21 percent rate. When GILTI 
applies, the flat 21 percent rate is cut roughly in 
half. In either case, if foreign taxes have been paid, 
there would be some amount of FTC.31
III. Foreign Producer Sales Into the United States
The above sections of this article have focused 
on profit shifting conducted by groups having 
one or more low-taxed foreign members that 
partially or wholly produce products within the 
United States. The new section 863(b) sourcing 
rule will also affect legitimate foreign producers 
that sell their fully foreign-manufactured 
products into the United States.
Traditional tax planning wisdom has typically 
discouraged producers from setting up sales 
branches to sell their manufactured products 
within other countries. This has been true for 
various nontax reasons, including the desire to 
secure limited liability protection that shields the 
group from excessive legal risks arising from local 
operations. Thus, when a producer from one 
country desires to set up its own distribution or 
other sales support network that goes beyond 
some limited functions such as market research 
(in which case the foreign producer might 
establish a representative office), it will most 
commonly establish a local subsidiary. One 
important tax reason for this traditional planning 
is to establish a more secure transfer price that 
will better delineate the income attributable to the 
local sales and distribution functions. The foreign 
producer wants to minimize the risk that the local 
country will claim that some portion of the 
income attributable to production intangibles and 
the production process itself becomes a part of 
that local country’s tax base.
In brief, the use of a local subsidiary for the sale 
and distribution of products results in 
intercompany transactions that are reflected in 
legally enforceable contracts and other documents 
between group members. In contrast, when a 
foreign producer maintains a sales branch, there is 
an intracompany home office/branch transfer value 
that has only internally generated management 
documentation for support. Despite the self-serving 
nature of these legally enforceable contracts and 29See sections 951A(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 952(b).
30
See reg. section 1.863-3(c)(1) and (g)(2). Current regulations provide 
that the adjusted basis of production assets located within and outside 
the United States shall be used to determine U.S.-source and foreign-
source income from production activities. New regulations under 
section 863(b) that may be issued could set out other factors to determine 
source.
31
See section 960, including new section 960(d) added by the TCJA to 
allow a partial FTC for GILTI.
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documents, tax authorities understandably give 
them more credibility than the internally generated 
documentation.
For purposes of illustration, assume that a 
foreign widget producer has manufacturing and 
related administration costs of $50. It then sells 
the widget at a price of $80 to its U.S. sales 
subsidiary, which in turn sells the widget to a 
customer for $100, incurring $10 of local expenses 
in the process. This leaves groupwide profit of $40 
with $30 of profit in the foreign producer, which 
reflects the value of production including 
production intangibles; and $10 of profit in the 
U.S. sales subsidiary, which reflects the value of 
sales and distribution functions including local 
marketing intangibles. Assume that title transfers 
from the foreign producer to the U.S. subsidiary 
when the products are physically within the 
United States.
Before the new section 863(b) amendment, the 
title passage rule would govern the source of the 
foreign widget producer’s gross income that is 
attributable to its sales activity. Thus, some 
portion of the producer’s gross income would be 
U.S. source. Despite this U.S.-source status, the 
producer would under normal circumstances 
avoid any U.S. tax because the producer has 
neither a trade or business in the United States nor 
a permanent establishment under any tax treaty 
that might be applicable. This means that the 
United States would only tax the $10 of profit 
recorded within the sales subsidiary, allowing the 
foreign widget producer to protect its $30 of 
manufacturing profit from U.S. taxation (ignoring 
of course the potential for transfer pricing 
adjustments).
With the new section 863(b) sourcing rule for 
manufactured inventory property, 100 percent of 
the gross income from sales into the United States 
by foreign-based manufacturers will now be 
foreign source. For our foreign widget producer 
selling to its U.S. sales subsidiary at $80, this 
means that none of its $30 of profits would be ECI, 
even if the producer were found to be conducting 
a trade or business in the United States or to have 
a PE under an applicable tax treaty.
Say that before the section 863(b) amendment, 
the foreign widget producer had been selling into 
the United States through a U.S. sales branch 
rather than the assumed local subsidiary. With 
this conduct of a trade or business within the 
United States and some amount of U.S.-source 
gross income as determined under the section 
863(b) regulations, it would have been taxable in 
the United States on some portion of its $40 of 
groupwide profits.
Now, with the section 863(b) amendment, the 
foreign widget producer will have zero U.S.-
source gross income, meaning that all the profit of 
$40 will escape ECI taxation. As a corollary, of 
course, with all gross income being foreign 
source, the expenses of the sales branch 
attributable to it could not be attributed to and 
deductible against any other ECI that the widget 
producer might have from other activities it 
conducts in the United States.
Given the foregoing, traditional tax planning 
may no longer apply to foreign producers that 
wish to set up their own sales and distribution 
operations in the United States. For example, 
when a foreign producer’s home country exempts 
from taxation or taxes the profits of a foreign sales 
branch at very reduced rates, there will be an 
incentive to sell into the United States through 
such a branch — that incentive being little or no 
home country tax and no U.S. tax.
What other incentive might there be? Say that 
a foreign producer with a U.S. sales subsidiary 
has material intercompany sales that it believes 
are at some risk of a transfer pricing adjustment.32 
If it were to transition in some manner to a sales 
branch structure, the sourcing based solely on 
location of production would cause complete 
nontaxability, thereby sidestepping for the future 
any ongoing transfer pricing risk.
Needless to say, when an existing sales or 
distribution subsidiary holds marketing rights 
and intangibles, any restructuring may have 
significant transfer pricing, legal ramifications, 
and other consequences from their transfer, all of 
which are outside the scope of this article. 
However, when a foreign producer is initiating its 
own sales or distribution operations for the first 
time or is initiating separate operations for a new 
product line so that there is no transfer of exiting 
32
An excellent example of a foreign producer that received IRS 
attention is GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. See IR-2006-142.
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marketing rights or intangibles, establishing a 
sales branch should carry little or no U.S. tax risk.
U.S. groups in their profit-shifting structures 
have made aggressive use of the check-the-box 
rules33 to create hybrid entities that avoid or 
minimize tax in the foreign countries in which they 
operate. Also, the simple check-the-box rules allow 
foreign producers to create hybrid entities for U.S. 
sales and distribution operations that would be 
separate taxpayers under their home country tax 
rules and disregarded entity (DRE) subsidiaries 
under the U.S. tax rules. With DRE status and the 
new section 863(b) source rule, foreign producers 
would be able to easily avoid both their home 
country tax and U.S. tax. Treasury may need to 
consider issuing future antiabuse rules that would 
override such structures.
The above discussion covers only domestic U.S. 
rules. When a foreign producer is covered by a tax 
treaty with the United States, there could potentially 
be treaty terms that define source, though in general, 
treaties do not act to increase the tax that would be 
due in excess of amounts otherwise owed under 
domestic law. The potential applicability of any 
sourcing rule as well as the implications of having a 
PE under a treaty would require separate 
investigation.
IV. Intangible Products
This article has been written primarily with 
the production and sale of tangible products in 
mind. There are, however, many intangible 
products sold with one multinational group both 
producing and selling the product. An obvious 
example of such a product is software, which 
under the terms of reg. section 1.861-18 can be 
treated as the sale or exchange of a product when 
provided to customers.34 Any other intangible 
products included within the section 865(i)(1) 
definition of inventory property would also fall 
into this category.
V. Effect on Transition Tax
With the transition from the former deferral 
system to the new territorial participation 
exemption system mandated by the TCJA, section 
965 imposes a one-time tax on accumulated post-
1986 deferred foreign income on U.S. shareholders, 
payable at the election of the taxpayer in eight 
annual installments. Say that a U.S. shareholder of a 
zero- or low-taxed CFC has been making 
installment payments regarding that CFC’s 
accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign income. 
Later, it is determined that for specific pre-TCJA 
years the CFC conducted a trade or business within 
the United States and had ECI subject to normal U.S. 
taxation.
In that event, with the determination that 
some portion of the CFC’s accumulated post-1986 
deferred foreign income is attributable to ECI, the 
tax base for the one-time transition tax would be 
adjusted downward.35
VI. Needed Amendment of Regulations
The amendment of section 863(b) requires at a 
minimum that changes be made to reg. section 
1.863-3 to explain and define how the new law is 
to be applied. This will provide an opportunity to 
modernize this regulation and others to reflect the 
business models now commonly used that did not 
exist many decades ago when the existing 
regulations were issued.36
Reg. section 1.863-3 now uses the adjusted 
basis and location of production assets owned by 
a taxpayer to determine the source of income from 
production activities. New business models have 
centralized production activities as well as 
production decision-making and management 
functions in the United States while relying on 
third-party contract manufacturers often located 
outside the United States. This creates an urgent 
need to update the section 863(b) sourcing rules. 
This update could both more fully define what 
should be considered as inventory property 
produced by a taxpayer and identify the factor or 
factors that would determine source. Any new 
rules that address business models using contract 
33
Reg. section 301.7701-1 to -3.
34
See reg. section 1.861-18(f)(2), which provides that section 863 will 
apply when appropriate to determine the source of income from 
transactions classified as sales or exchanges of copyrighted articles. See 
also examples 3, 5, 6, and 7 and the related discussion in Kadet, supra 
note 3.
35
See section 965(d)(2)(A).
36
Several specific suggestions for updating existing regulations were 
included in Kadet and Koontz, supra note 12.
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manufacturers should be consistent with reg. 
section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv), which was amended 
effective from 2009 to focus on such business 
models for purposes of subpart F.37 Because 
contract manufacturing has been an important 
part of business models and profit-shifting 
structures for several decades now, it is long past 
the time to make similar changes to the ECI and 
sourcing rules. Modernization should include the 
production and sale of intangibles such as 
software. Antiabuse rules could also be amended 
to reflect today’s profit-shifting structures as well 
as to cover possible new structures such as those 
mentioned in the above section on foreign 
producer sales into the United States.
VII. Concluding Comments
In addition to the new sourcing rule applicable 
to both domestic and foreign taxpayers, the above 
discussion has highlighted several significant TCJA 
changes to the code, including a lower corporate tax 
rate, the participation exemption, and the GILTI 
provisions. But much has not changed. In short, 
although an oversimplification, it’s fair to say that 
much of the code and its myriad rules have 
remained basically intact while some new 
complicated layers have been added. This lack of 
change means that the existing ECI provisions are 
very much a constant for all years, whether pre- or 
post-TCJA.38 The move from the prior deferral 
system to the new territorial participation 
exemption system does not change this one iota, 
except for the new sourcing of income rule.
The IRS has made clear over the past few years 
that it does not like and is willing to challenge 
many profit-shifting structures now used by 
multinational companies. In doing so it has 
primarily used as tools either transfer pricing or 
recharacterization, both of which are subjective 
and carry considerable uncertainty of success in 
the inevitable litigation process.39 In contrast, 
when the facts support it, the existence of a 
partnership for tax purposes and the 
determination of ECI are relatively objective.
The authors have seen no evidence to date that 
the IRS has attempted to counter the effects of profit-
shifting structures through application of the ECI 
rules. If the IRS should decide to apply ECI in the 
future, taxpayers are unlikely to be able to rely on 
the statute of limitations to prevent application of 
the ECI rules to prior tax years. This is because for 
any tax years that the low-taxed foreign member 
failed to file its own separate tax return, those years 
remain open to examination. Low-taxed foreign 
members would not, of course, have been eligible to 
join with their U.S. affiliated group in the filing of a 
consolidated tax return. This means that when the 
facts justify it, the IRS has the authority to look back 
many years and assess tax, interest, and penalties. 
Unless a low-taxed foreign member actually filed 
Form 1120-F for a prior year that started the running 
of the statute of limitations for that year, that prior 
year will still be open. That is true even if that year 
has already closed for the U.S. affiliated group.40
Despite no apparent evidence of the 
application of ECI taxation to multinational 
profit-shifting structures, there is evidence that 
the IRS believes that ECI taxation is relevant and 
worth an increased investment in manpower and 
training. This is supported by the Form 1120-F 
nonfiler campaign included in the January 31, 
2017, rollout of the IRS Large Business and 
International Division’s initial 13 campaigns.
Considering the above, we recommend that 
multinationals using the types of profit-shifting 
structures discussed in this article and our previous 
articles reassess their facts and circumstances and 
consider whether such structures should be 
continued, modified to better align profits with 
value creation, or unwound.41 
37
In brief, reg. section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv) provides rules for determining 
whether personal property sold by a CFC will be considered to have 
been manufactured, produced, or constructed by that CFC when the 
physical manufacturing, producing, and construction activities are not 
performed by the CFC. See also T.D. 9438.
38
The TCJA affects ECI taxation through the section 863(b) change 
discussed herein and even expanded it through the addition of section 
864(c)(8) concerning the sale or exchange of some partnership interests.
39
Over the past several years, Tax Notes has included numerous 
articles and documents concerning ongoing IRS and taxpayer disputes, 
including those with Microsoft, Facebook, and Caterpillar.
40
See section 6501(c)(3).
41
For the discussion and recommendations provided for groups and 
their outside auditors, see Kelly, Koontz, and Kadet, “Profit Shifting: 
Effectively Connected Income and Financial Statement Risks,” supra note 
3, and Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures: Making Ethical 
Judgments Objectively, Part 1,” supra note 3. The latter article proposes 
an ethical benchmark that multinationals can use to objectively test the 
propriety of their profit-shifting structures.
